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COMMUNITY AND SEPARATE PROPERTY
INTERESTS IN LIFE INSURANCE
PROCEEDS: A FRESH LOOK
This comment examines the difficult problem of characterizing the
proceeds of a life insurance policy as separate or community property
where the policy insures the life of a spouse and premiums have been
paid with both separate and community funds.1 The problem com-
monly arises when a person takes out a life insurance policy while sin-
gle, pays the first few premiums from separate funds, and then main-
tains the policy with community funds following marriage.2 Upon
death of the insured spouse, the characterization of the proceeds as
separate or community or partially both is significant for two reasons.
Not only may such characterization determine the amount of policy
proceeds that the insured may dispose of through beneficiary designa-
tion, but it will also affect the determination of the estate and inheri-
tance tax liability of the deceased spouse.
A majority of the courts in community property jurisdictions3 that
have considered this issue have concluded that the proceeds are the
separate property of the insured spouse because he or she paid the first
premium, or "bought" the policy.4 Other courts have divided the pro-
ceeds between the community and separate estates in proportion to
the number of years each paid premiums. 5 This comment suggests
that neither of these approaches is appropriate. Rather, when both
separate and community estates have paid premiums on a life insur-
ance policy, its cash value,6 if any, should be characterized as separate
1. In the most common factual situation, the husband has been the insured policy-
owner. However, the principles discussed herein are equally applicable when the wife
is the insured.
2. A similar problem can arise when a policy is taken out during marriage by one
spouse and it is not disposed of in a subsequent divorce decree. If the owner continues
the policy premium payments after divorce, allocatio between community and sep-
arate interests again may be required. See notes 116-19 and accompanying text infra.
3. The following states comprise the American community property jurisdictions:
Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington.
4. This is the inception of title rule which has been accepted by the supreme courts
of Arizona, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Texas. See Part II-A infra.
5. This is the apportionment rule which has been accepted in California and Wash-
ington. See Part II-B infra. Courts in the remaining two community property states,
Nevada and Idaho, have not yet been confronted with a case requiring them to choose
a rule allocating insurance proceeds between community and separate estates.
6. The cash value of life insurance (or cash surrender value as it is also called)
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and community according to the number of years each estate paid the
premiums, and proceeds attributable to the risk or protection portion 7
of the policy should be allocated according to the character of the es-
tate which paid the last premium before death.
I. THE NATURE OF LIFE INSURANCE AS PROPERTY
A. Term Insurance
There are two basic types of life insurance: term insurance and cash
value insurance. The former insures one's life for a stated period or
term of years. Term insurance has other distinctive characteristics as
well. First, the premiums purchase protection only from risk of death;
they do not build up a cash surrender value.8 In this respect, term life
insurance is analogous to fire or auto insurance. 9 Much term insur-
ance is also renewable. This means that at the end of the term it may
be renewed for a limited number of successive terms; the insured is
not required to show evidence of insurability.' 0 Term insurance may
also be convertible. The convertibility feature allows the policyholder
to exchange his term insurance for a cash value policy without evi-
dence of insurability." Term insurance can be purchased as an indi-
vidual policy or by participation in a group life insurance plan.' 2
is the value of the cumulative savings or investment portion of the policy. See Part I-B
infra.
7. The risk or protection portion of the policy is the face value minus the cash
value, if any. The face value of a policy is the amount which will be paid to the bene-
ficiaries upon the insured's death.
8. Term policies have little or no cash value. See note 124 infra.
9. Life insurance, however, is not a contract for indemnity as is fire or auto in-
surance. An indemnity contract pays only the amount of the insured's loss, regardless
of the face amount of the policy. A life insurance policy, on the other hand, is a con-
tract to pay a stated sum, the face amount, on the insurer's death. See D. MCGILL,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF LIFE INSURANCE 23 (1959).
10. Evidence of insurability may include demonstration of good health, verified by
a physical examination, and proof of being younger than a certain maximum age. See
J. MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE 249-87 (9th ed. 1962).
11. The conversion privilege allows one who is otherwise uninsurable to purchase
insurance. For example, assume one purchases a non-renewable ten-year term policy
and becomes uninsurable sometime during the ten years. If the policy is convertible,
then sometime before the expiration of his term policy the insured can convert it into
a whole life policy of the same face amount under which he can remain insured until
age 100. If the term plan is not convertible, upon expiration of the ten-year term
policy, the insured would be without insurance, and being uninsurable, he could obtain
none.
12. Group term life insurance covers a group of people under a master policy
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For purposes of this discussion, the most important feature of term
insurance is that it exists only by virtue of each advance premium
payment. Protection for the coming year depends exclusively upon
payment of an advance premium. The length of time the insured has
had the policy and the number of premiums previously paid are irrele-
vant. If the term passes without the insured's death, the protection
purchased expires without loss. The insured has had the benefit of
protection for the year and it has been "used up." He must pay an-
other premium to enjoy further protection. Although this principle
appears simple, no state supreme court in a community property juris-
diction has recognized it.13
B. Cash Value Insurance
Like term insurance, cash value insurance 14 contains a risk or pro-
tection element. In addition to this protection element, however, cash
which is usually issued without a medical examination of the individual participants.
Typically, it is issued to an employer for the benefit of employees. The individual mem-
bers of the group hold certificates rather than policies as evidence of their insurance.
See INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 117 (1975) [herein-
after cited as-LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK]. Virtually all group insurance is renewable
term insurance. In 1974, 99.2% of group life insurance in force in the United States
was group term life insurance. Id. at 24. See also D. GREGG, GROUP LIFE INSURANCE
2, 3, 82, 83 (3d ed. 1962).
13. The Arizona appellate courts, however, have accepted this reasoning for deal-
ing with term insurance policies. Lock v. Lock, 8 Ariz. App. 138, 444 P.2d 163 (1968);
Gaethje v. Gaethje, 7 Ariz. App. 544, 441 P.2d 579 (1968). See notes 100 & 101 and
accompanying text infra.
14. The primary types of cash value policies are:
a. Whole Life Insurance: In a whole life policy premium payments continue until
death or age 100. For new policies of the same face value at any given age, whole life
premiums are higher than term premiums because the whole life policy contains, in
addition to the protection element, a savings or investment element that grows con-
tinually throughout the life of the policy until it equals the face value of the policy at
age 100. This savings element is the policy's cash value. If one cancels a whole life
policy before payments are completed, the policy owner has the right to the current
cash value of the policy. Whole life is also known as ordinary life and straight life.
b. Endowment Life Insurance: In an endowment policy the insurance company
promises to pay the insured or his designee the face value of the policy at the end of
a stated period of time (e.g., in 20 years or at age 65), or to pay the beneficiary the
face value if the insured dies before the specified period ends. When the full time pe-
riod has run and the face value paid to the insured or designee, the endowment is said
to have matured. As with whole life insurance, the insured can withdraw any cash
value accumulated if the policy is cancelled.
c. Paid-up Life Insurance: In a paid-up insurance policy the insured makes a lump
sum-payment or pays a designated number of installments. When such payments are
completed additional premiums are not required and the policy remains in effect until
its maturity which is either at the insured's death or at age 100, whichever occurs first.
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value insurance also contains a savings or investment portion. t5
Throughout the life of the policy, and as long as premiums are paid,
the cash value grows. Thus, cash value is the equity which builds up
over time by reason of the premium payments. The policyowner can
borrow against this equity from the insurance company and can re-
ceive its value if he cancels the policy. Even when premiums are not
As in the other types of cash value policies, the insured has a right to receive the pol-
icy's accumulated investment portion upon cancellation.
For a more complete discussion of these three types of policies see S. HUEBNER &
K. BLACK, JR., LIFE INSURANCE chs. 6 & 7 (8th ed. 1972): THE CONSUMERS UNION RE-
PORT ON LIFE INSURANCE ch. 2 (rev. ed. 1972).
15. This aspect of cash value insurance has been described variously by commen-
tators on insurance. In J. BELTH, THE RETAIL PRICE STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE
INSURANCE 35 (1966), the author suggests that "[cash value insurance] should come
to be viewed consistently as a combination of savings and yearly renewable term in-
surance." Another author notes:
Straight life insurance ... may be considered to be a combination of decreasing
term insurance (the pure protection element) and an increasing savings or invest-
ment element which equals the face value at age 100.
Other forms of whole life insurance and endowment insurance may be viewed
in the same way ....
Williams, Contracts-Whole Life and Endowment, in LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE
HANDBOOK 66, 70 (3d ed. 1973). See also THE CONSUMERS UNION REPORT ON LIFE
INSURANCE ch. 2 (rev. ed. 1972). As a consequence of this division of cash value in-
surance into two parts. the policyholder does not actually "own" protection equivalent
to the face value of the insurance:
In viewing the cash value as an asset, the policyholder must then realize that
the amount of actual life insurance protection he owns at any given time is the
face amount of the policy less the cash value at that time, and not the entire face
amount. This concept is critical to a clear understanding of the nature of life in-
surance.
J. BELTH . A REPORT ON LIFE INSURANCE 11 (1967) (emphasis in original). See also
notes 120. 126, 138 & 139 and accompanying text infra.
Insurance texts generally treat cash value life insurance in this manner. See, e.g.,
I W. BEADLES & J. GREIDER, PRINCIPLES OF LIFE INSURANCE 3 1-32, 36-39 (rev. ed.
1972); S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, JR., Sulpra note 14, at 10-11, 88-89, 94-95; J. MAC-
LEAN. suipra note 10, at 14-16; A. MOWBRAY . R. BLANCHARD & C. WILLIAMS, JR.. IN-
SURANCE: ITS THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 307 (6th ed. 1969). See
also J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2 (1965); J. BELTH, LIFE INSUR-
ANCE: A CONSUMIERS' HANDBOOK 23 (1973): G. REYNOLDS. THE MORTALITY MERCHANTS
chs. 2 & 3 (1968).
Commentators on marital rights and life insurance also recognize the dual nature
of cash value life insurance. See, e.g., Stephens, Life Insurance and Community Prop-
erty in Texas-Revisited, 10 Sw. L.J. 343. 350 (1956); Comment, Life Insurance as
Alimony-Income Tax Aspects, 34 LA. L. REV. 114, 118 n.30 (1973).
The recent trend toward price disclosure in life insurance is based on the fact that, for
practical purposes, cash value insurance is composed of protection and savings ele-
ments. See Belth. Life Insurance Price Measurement, 57 Ky. L.J. 687 (1969): Belth.
Price Disclosure in Life Insurance, 1972 WIs. L. REV. 1054, 1054-55; Kimball & Rapa-
port, What Price "Price Disclosure"? The Trend to Consumer Protection in Life In-
surance, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 1025, 1027-29.
The following diagram illustrates the relationship between the two segments of a
whole life policy. The amount of cash value closely approximates the amount of the
reserve element.
354
Community Property Life Insurance
paid this equity continues to exist, although it ceases to grow. As is
true with respect to term insurance, however, the protection portion of
cash value insurance exists only by reason of the last premium pay-
ment.' 6 Thus, cash value life insurance has both a temporary protec-
tion (or term insurance) portion that must be paid for annually,' 7 and
a permanent cumulative investment portion.
II. THE DISPOSITION OF LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS
WHEN PREMIUMS HAVE BEEN PAID WITH BOTH
SEPARATE AND COMMUNITY FUNDS
A. The Inception of Title Rule and Its Application to Life Insurance
Under Spanish community property law, the spouse who initiates
acquisition of property before marriage and completes payment after
$1,000 _
$800 -
Net Amount At Risk or
Protection Element$60o - __ ___ ______ __
$400 /
Reserve 
or
Investment Element
$200 -_
$0 ,
30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Attained Age
S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, JR., supra note 14, at 10.
16. The original form of the policy can be maintained only through continued
premium payments. That is, the cash value will continue to increase, the protection
element will continue to exist, and the original face amount will continue to be main-
tained only if regular payments are made.
17. An exception does exist to this general rule. In 1974, 5.5% of the total face
amount of individual life insurance in effect in the U.S. consisted of policies in which
all payments had been made. Of the total amount in effect, paid-up whole life con-
sisted of 3.9% and extended term consisted of 1.6%. The protection portion of these
policies did continue to exist independent of future payments. See LiFE INSURANCE
FACT BOOK at 34.
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marriage acquires separate property. 18 Louisiana, New Mexico, and
Texas have explicitly adopted this inception of title rule in instances
where part of the consideration is paid before marriage, title is trans-
ferred, and the balance of the consideration is paid during coverture
with community funds. 19 In these circumstances, the community es-
tate is entitled to reimbursement for the funds it paid.2 0 These states
also hold that property acquired with funds expended both during
marriage and after dissolution of the community by death or divorce
is community in character. Likewise, the separate estate can be reim-
bursed for expenditures made from it.21
Courts that apply the inception of title rule to the characterization
of life insurance proceeds advance several arguments to support its
use. Such arguments, however, are based upon questionable precedent
and faulty logic. None survive careful analysis in light of the character
of life insurance.
1. The In re Moseman precedent
Each of the state courts that have adopted the inception of title
rule in the life insurance context has relied upon the leading 1886 de-
cision of In re Moseman.2 2 In Moseman the Louisiana Supreme Court
18. This principle is applicable to both real and personal property. See W. DEFu-
NIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 64, at 130 & n.96 (2d ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN].
19. Baker v. Baker. 209 La. 1041, 26 So. 2d 132 (1946); Hollingsworth v. Hicks.
57 N.M. 336, 258 P.2d 724 (1953); Colden v. Alexander, 141 Tex. 134, 171 S.W.2d
328 (1943); DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN § 64. Although deFuniak disagrees, Professor Harry
Cross believes Washington also may have adopted this rule. See Cross, The Com-
munity Property Law in Washington, 49 WASH. L. REV. 729, 758-63 (1974). In Ari-
zona the rule adopted is not entirely clear. Idaho and Nevada hold that property is
part separate and part community in proportion to the amounts of the respective funds
used if separate and community funds are used in its acquisition. See DEFUNIAK &
VAUGHN § 64, at 133-34.
20. See DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN § 64, at 133.
21. See id. § 68.2. at 152.
22. 38 La. Ann. 219 (1886). In McCurdy v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1963), the court followed Moseman after citing it with approval. The Texas
Supreme Court approved the holding of McCurdy by refusing a writ of error. Under
Texas practice, a writ of error is refused "where the judgment of the Court of Civil
Appeals is a correct one and where the principles of law declared in the opinion of
the court are correctly determined ...." TEX. R. Civ. P. 483 (1976). In Rothman v.
Rumbeck, 54 Ariz. 443, 96 P.2d 755 (1939), the Arizona Supreme Court relied on
Verneuille's Succession, 120 La. 605, 45 So. 520 (1908), a Louisiana life insurance
case, as authority for Arizona's acceptance of the inception of title rule. Verneuille's
Succession in turn relied on Moseinan. In In re White's Estate, 43 N.M. 202, 89 P.2d
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held that when a life insurance policy in which the insured's estate is
beneficiary is taken out before marriage, and subsequent premiums
are paid with community funds after marriage, the policy proceeds
are the separate property of the insured spouse. The court reasoned
that the ownership and contract rights of the life insurance contract
vested on the date of the first premium payment. Thus, where the first
premium was paid from the insured's separate funds, subsequent
community payments could not divest the interest of the insured's sep-
arate estate.
The reasoning in Moseman is faulty because the court misunder-
stood the nature of the life insurance contract. The court failed to
recognize that the insurance contract is unilateral rather than bilat-
eral, and that premiums are periodic payments, not installment pay-
ments. An insurance policy is not a bilateral contract because the
insured does not promise in advance to pay premiums as they become
due. Thus, failure to make such payments on the part of the insured
does not give rise to legal liability for breach of contract.23 Further-
more, the insured cannot bind the insurance company merely by
promising to pay the premiums, but must perform the act of paying to
bind the company. These characteristics of the life insurance contract
stem from the general principle of contract law that a unilateral con-
tract does not arise until the required act is performed. In a unilateral
contract, performance is acceptance. 24
The Moseman court's failure to recognize the unilateral nature of
the insurance contract resulted in two erroneous conclusions. First,
the court determined that all the rights of the insured in the insurance
contract, including the death benefit under which the insured died
36 (1939), the New Mexico Supreme Court relied on G. McKAY, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY §§ 479-80 (2d ed. 1925), as authority for its accept-
ance of the inception of title rule. McKAY quoted Moseman approvingly and relied on
both Moseman and Succession of Le Blanc, 142 La. 27, 76 So. 223 (1917), a Lou-
isiana case that followed the reasoning of Moseman.
23. The rule has thus been stated:
A life insurance policy is a unilateral contract. Only the insurer makes any le-
gally enforceable promises. The insured does not even promise to pay premiums.
It is impossible for him to be held for breach of contract. Payment of premiums
is merely a condition precedent for the continuation of the promise of the insurer
in its present form.
R. MEHR & R. OSLER, MODERN LIFE INSURANCE 149 (3d ed. 1961). See also D. MCGILL,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF LIFE INSURANCE 22 (1959).
24. See note 28 infra.
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years later, were created when the one original premium was paid.25
The second and related error was the court's conclusion that the in-
sured acquired the contract rights from the date of the first premium
payment "subject to the condition of compliance with his own engage-
ments to pay the premiums. '26 The court reasoned that the subse-
quent premium payments were merely conditions precedent to the
enforcement of a bilateral contract which had been created years be-
fore. 27 According to the court, the rights of the parties were deter-
mined at the time the original contract was made because the condi-
tion precedent had occurred. In actuality, because the insurance con-
tract is properly characterized as a unilateral contract, the condition
precedent and the payment of consideration are performed simultane-
ously.28 The insured makes no promise to pay any future premiums
and there is no corresponding relation back of his rights to the date of
the first premiums payment. No retroactive rights or obligations arise.
25. The court stated:
The contract [of insurance] creates certain rights and obligations which spring
into existence the moment it is formed. Thus, at the date of the policies, Mose-
man acquired for himself the right to receive, at his death, through his executors,
administrators or assigns, the sums stipulated to be paid, subject to the condition
of compliance with his own engagements to pay the premiums as they fell due.
This condition having been complied with, "has a retrospective effect to the day
that the engagement was contracted." C.C. 2041. The character of the interest
and of the ownership thereof takes its impress from the date of the contract.
38 La. Ann. 219, 221 (1886).
26. Id.
27. The common law of contracts recognizes that with the performance of a con-
dition precedent, all contractual obligations that the parties previously entered into
become fixed and absolute. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 138
(1970). The civil code of Louisiana contains a similar provision, which was relied
upon by the court in Moseman: "The condition being complied with, has a retroactive
effect to the day that the engagement was contracted ...." LA. CIV. CODE art. 2041
(West 1972). However, both the common and the civil law presumption is that a bi-
lateral contract is being dealt with in the application of this principle. The principle
does not make sense when dealing with unilateral contracts.
28. The term "condition precedent" is used in a different sense when dealing with
a bilateral contract than when dealing with a unilateral contract. A condition precedent
in a bilateral contract is an act that must occur before the duty of immediate per-
formance under an existing contract arises. When concerned with the unilateral con-
tract, however, an act must not only necessarily occur before the duty of immediate
performance arises, but the condition precedent must occur before a contract is even
formed. Therefore, "performance of the act is the acceptance of the offer." J. CALA-
MARl & J. PERILLO, supra note 27, § 138. This common law reasoning is valid for the
civil law of Louisiana as well. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 1761 (definition of a con-
tract), 1765 (definition of unilateral and bilateral contracts), 2021 (definition of sus-
pensive and resolutory conditions, analogous to conditions precedent and subsequent
in the common law), & 2041 (retroactive effect of fulfillment of a suspensive condi-
tion) (West 1972).
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In addition to disregarding the unilateral nature of the life insur-
ance contract, the Moseman court also overlooked the fact that pre-
miums were periodic, not installment, payments, i.e., each additional
payment resulted in a new unilateral contract. Thus, the insured did
not purchase the insurance protection piecemeal, as in an installment
sales contract; rather, he acquired the whole property right, albeit for
a shorter discrete period of time.29 Under this analysis, the proceeds
in Moseman should have been the property of the community because
it had paid the last premium and thus had created the unilateral con-
tract in effect at the insured's death.30
2. Analogy to improvements on land
A second reason advanced in support of the inception of title rule is
that the use of community funds to pay life insurance premiums on a
policy acquired before marriage is analogous to the use of community
funds to make improvements on land that is the separate property of
one spouse.31 Courts that adopt this reasoning find the property sepa-
rate in character and allow a right of reimbursement to the commu-
nity for the value of the funds it expends. This analogy is inappro-
priate to life insurance, however, because its property characteristics
are significantly different from those of land or other forms of prop-
erty to which this reasoning has been applied.3 2 Each periodic pre-
mium payment does not improve existing property as much as it cre-
ates a new right to future protection. In such circumstances, the prop-
erty procured should acquire the ownership characteristics of the
funds utilized for the purchase.3 3 Thus, if community funds are used
to pay the most recent premium on a life insurance policy, the com-
29. See note 80 and accompanying text infra.
30. If cash value existed, its apportionment between the competing estates, in addi-
tion to the characterization of the risk portion of the policy according to which estate
paid the last premium, would have been the appropriate approach to the allocation of
the proceeds. See Part III-B infra.
31. See, e.g., Rothman v. Rumbeck, 54 Ariz. 443, 96 P.2d 755, 759 (1939);
DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN § 79, at 190,
32. See Part I supra.
33. See DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN § 79, at 190-91, where the authors suggest that this
principle should be followed in dealing with life insurance, rather than the inception
of title (with reimbursement) principle. They suggest that application of the principle
leads to the apportionment doctrine. See also Note, 42 TEXAS L. REv. 747, 751 (1964).
The correct application of this rule, however, leads to application of the risk payment
rule. See Part I1-A infra.
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munity purchases the policy's protection and the community should
own the incidents of that protection.
3. Uniformity
Some courts, in addition to relying on Moseman, have maintained
that uniformity with the state's rule regarding acquisition of realty
militates for application of the inception of title rule to life insur-
ance. 34 As was pointed out in the improvement of separate property
analogy, this argument overlooks the significant differences between
life insurance and other forms of property. The rights and obligations
that arise upon a periodic premium payment do not parallel those
which accrue when an installment payment is made on a land sales
contract. 35 The uniformity reasoning thus substitutes a simplistic re-
sult for careful analysis.
4. Equity
Equity is another reason advanced for adoption of the inception of
title rule.36 Actually, however, the inception of title rule is particularly
unfair to the noninsured spouse for a number of reasons. First, it does
not fully account for the noninsured spouse's interest in the policy.
When insurance is taken out before marriage, the inception of title
rule recognizes the interest of the noninsured spouse as only one-half
of the premiums paid from community funds. Thus, the protection
element of the policy remains perpetually separate. Because of this
unfairness, commentators have severely criticized the doctrine, 37 and
34. See Berry v. Franklin State Bank & Trust Co., 186 La. 623, 173 So. 126, 131
(1937); McCurdy v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
35. See Part I supra.
36. In McCurdy v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), the court
stated:
The inception of title rule is not less equitable in results [than the apportion-
ment method]. While in this case the proceeds which would be proportionately
attributable to the community under the tracing theory happened to exceed the
community premium payments, in another case the gross premiums so paid out
might well exceed the total proceeds. To permit the nature of the property to be
determined by the monetary result is not necessarily equitable ....
Id. at 384. See Note, 42 TEXAs L. REV. 747, 750-51 (1964), for a discussion and
criticism of this passage.
37. Note, Community Property-Life Insurance-Application of the Inception of
Title Doctrine, 18 Sw. L.J. 521, 525-27 (1964); Note, 42 TEXAs L. REV. 747, 750-52
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one federal court in an inception of title jurisdiction has refused to
follow it.3 8 Even the Louisiana judiciary has begun to criticize the
rule.39 It also has been suggested that constructive fraud on the non-
insured spouse may result when most of the premiums have been paid
with community funds. 40
A second inequity may result where a separate policy's premiums
have been paid largely with community funds and where the policy's
cash value exceeds the total amount of the premiums paid.41 This ex-
cess of cash value over total premiums paid is profit to the taxpayer
policyowner and is taxable as such.42 Under the inception of title rule,
(1964); Ray, Life Insurance, Community Property & Death Taxes in Texas, 26 TEXAS
BAR J. 835, 896 (1963).
38. Parson v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Tex. 1970). However, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed despite its recognition of the inequi-
ties of the inception of title rule. Parson v. United States, 460 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.
1972). The appellate court reluctantly concluded:
We are not unmindful of the possible inequities which might arise from the
slavish application of the "inception of title" rule of life insurance and other
areas. Nevertheless, under Erie we cannot skirt the clear import of state decision-
al law solely because the result is harsh.
Id. at 234.
State courts also have refused to follow the inception of title rule. In states that
have not accepted the apportionment rule for life insurance the inception of title
rule has been held inapplicable for determining community and separate interests in
retirement benefits. See Lynch v. Lawrence, 293 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 1974); Ramsey
v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 535 P.2d 53 (1975); Rister v. Rister, 512 S.W.2d 72 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1974). The following cases discuss the relation of the inception of title rule
to pension benefits: Mitchim v. Mitchim, 509 S.W.2d 720, 725 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974);
Dessommes v. Dessommes, 505 S.W.2d 673, 781 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); LeClert v.
LeClert, 80 N.M. 235, 453 P.2d 755, 756 (1969). It is not logical to continue to use
one rule for life insurance and another for pension benefits because a portion of cash
value life insurance is a cumulative asset (the cash value) analogous to retirement
benefits.
39. See Succession of Mendoza, 288 So. 2d 673, 675-76 (La. App. 1973)
(concurring opinion), which involved death benefits of an employer-provided plan
which was analogous to insurance. A commentator on the case agreed with the con-
curring judge that the inception of title rule can be very 'unfair. LeVan, Trusts,
Survey--The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term,
35 LA. L. Rv. 333,339-40 (1975).
40. See Note, Community Property--Life Insurance-Application of the Incep-
tion of Title Doctrine, supra note 37, at 526. Constructive fraud-fraud on one
spouse without the specific intent of the other spouse to defraud-is recognized both
under the Spanish community property system and in the American community
property jurisdictions. See DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN §§ 119, 123, 126. See also Davis v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 331 F.2d 346, 351-52 (5th Cir. 1964). See note 115
infra.
41. The cash value of a whole life policy taken out before age 35 will begin to
exceed the total of the premiuns paid at approximately age 60 to 65. See, e.g., BEST'S
FLITCRAFT COMPEND 152, 155 (88th ed. A.M. Best Co. 1975).
42. This excess of cash value over the total of all premiums paid is the result of
compound interest. The excess is taxable as ordinary income when the policy is sur-
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this profit inures solely to the benefit of the separate estate.43 In es-
sence, then, the community not only has loaned money interest free to
the separate estate, 44 but it has been deprived of valuable investment
capital. It should be noted that the dollars with which the community
is reimbursed will have lost much of their original value because of
inflation. 45 Thus, the equities of this situation do not support the in-
ception of title rule.
rendered and is considered profit to the policyowner. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 72
(e); Treas. Reg. § 1.72-1 l(d), T.D. 6885, 1966-2 Cum. BULL. 307.
43. Under the inception of title rule this profit is considered to be the separate
property of the policyowner spouse; the community is entitled only to reimburse-
ment of premiums paid. However, Louisiana and Texas statutes state that the profit
of separate property must be community property. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 2386,
2402 (West 1972); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01 (1975). Therefore, the application
of the inception of title rule conflicts with the statutory scheme in those states.
Idaho also provides that the profit of separate property must be community property.
IDAHO CODE § 32-906 (1963). However, the Idaho Supreme Court has not had
occasion to adopt a rule. See note 5 supra.
An example is illustrative. The figures utilized are derived from BEST'S FLITCRAFT
COMPEND, supra note 41, at 152, 155. Assume that a single male age 25 purchases a
$10,000 non-participating (non-dividend paying) whole life insurance policy and
pays the initial premium of $132.50. He subsequently marries and pays 39 subse-
quent premiums with community funds. If the insured surrenders the policy at age
65, its cash value would be $5,730. With this amount, he could reimburse the com-
munity $5,167.50 for the 39 premiums it paid (of this amount one-half represents
the wife's share) and realize $430 profit for himself as his separate property. Thus.
the profit equals cash value received less the cost of reimbursement to the community
and to the separate estates for premiums paid. This result violates the Texas and
I.ouisiana statutes.
Even if the person in this example did not cash in his policy at age 65. but he
instead died at that age, application of the inception of title rule would still violate
the Texas and Louisiana statutes because his estate would realize separate profit. If
his estate received the $10,000 face value, the proceeds would represent: (1) cash
value equal to the total of all premiums paid ($5,300); (2) a profit or excess of cash
value over the total of premiums paid ($430); and (3) a risk or protection element
($4,270). See note 120 infra. If he reimburses the community for premiums it paid
($5,167.50), then his separate estate would still receive: (1) reimbursement for the
separate premium paid ($132.50); (2) the profit or excess of cash value over the total
premiums paid ($430); and (3) all the risk element proceeds ($4,270). Inflation
aggravates this inequity.
There are no practical differences between saving one's money in a bank and sav-
ing it in a cash value policy that are significant enough to justify their being treated
so differently. In neither is one compelled to deposit; in both one is taxed only
upon the income or profit, in both one can withdraw his money at any time. and in
both the sum is considered as an asset of the owner-depositor.
44. Lost interest can be significant. Using the fact pattern in note 43 supra, the
community is entitled to a reimbursement of $5,167.50 for the premiums paid. If the
community had, instead, invested the $132.50 each year for 39 years and received
an after-tax return of a conservative 4% per year compounded annually, it would
have accumulated $12,458.45--over twice as much. Thus, the community is deprived
of $7,290.95.
45. From 1800 to 1940 the cost of living in the United States, as measured by
the consumer price index, was relatively stable. Therefore, when the inception of
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5. Simplicity
The inception of title rule has been upheld in part because of its
simplicity of application.46 All the court need do is determine whether
the first premium was paid with separate funds. Although the rule is
simple, neither of its alternatives is complex, and the benefits of sim-
plicity should not outweigh the ill effects of an unsound logical basis
and the inequity of the inception of title approach.
6. Life-long contract
Some commentators have argued that the life insurance contract
constitutes a single life-long contract rather than a series of yearly
renewable contracts.47 If this contention is accurate, the inception of
title rule would seem to be sound. Arguments advanced to substantiate
the continuous contract view, however, do not survive analysis. The
first of these arguments is that the level premium of a whole life policy
during the insured's life indicates the existence of one continuous life-
long contract.48 Advocates of this reasoning contend that "[t] he risk
[of death] becomes greater with advanced age but the premium
remains constant indicating it bears no relation to the year it was
paid. '49 This statement is incorrect. The risk of one's death increases
yearly. The insurance company can recognize this increased risk ei-
ther by charging more per year (as it does in one-year renewable term
title doctrine was formulated in 1886, inflation was not a common problem. Since
1940, however, the cost of living has quadrupled. See Table 122, The Consumer
Price Index, 1800-1974, in U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR,
HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 313 (reference ed. 1975); Wall St. J., Jan. 22, 1976,
at 1, col. 4. Assuming that inflation continues to be a problem, courts should con-
sider interest and inflation factors when applying rules of law first set down 100
years ago during times of stable price levels. See Bartke, Yours, Mine and Ours-
Separate and Community Funds, 44 WASH. L. REV. 379, 389-90, 419 (1969).
46. See, e.g., McCurdy v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
47. W. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 49, at 297-99 (3d ed.
1951); Catlett, Status of the Proceeds of Life Insurance Under the Community
Property System, 5 WASH. L. REV. 45, 47 (1930); Mulligan, Does War Excuse the
Payment of Life Insurance Premiums? 17 FORDHAM L. REV. 63, 74 (1948); Com-
ment, Life Insurance Proceeds as Community Property, 13 WASH. L. REV. 321, 324
(1938).
48. W. VANCE, supra note 47, at 298-99; Catlett, supra note 47, at 47; Mulligan,
supra note 47, at 74; Comment, supra note 47, at 324-25.
49. Mulligan, supra note 47, at 74. This level premium aspect of whole life
insurance contrasts with term policy premiums which increase at the expiration of
each term, reflecting an enhanced risk of death because of increased age during the
subsequent period.
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insurance) or by decreasing the amount of protection it affords (as it
does in decreasing term insurance). In cash value insurance the
amount of pure protection decreases each year as the cash value in-
creases. 50 This is a result of the annual increase in the cost of protec-
tion. 5'
Another argument advanced in support of the continuous contract
theory is that a whole life policy is intended to cover the insured for
the duration of his life.52 This is also incorrect. Persons presently 96
years of age or older5 3 who have throughout their lives paid whole
life premiums are now without insurance protection because their
policies have matured. 54 Therefore, they did not in fact purchase a
continuous life-long contract of insurance but one which was an-
nually renewable55 until age 96.
Other arguments supporting the continuous contract theory like-
wise lack merit. Under a view that was once widely held, a premium
payment was treated as a condition subsequent under a continuous
50. See note 15 supra.
51. One commentator indicates:
One [implication of the view that cash value insurance can be considered as
separable into a term insurance element and a savings element] is the fact that
such an approach will show . . . that the yearly price per $1000 of protection
has a tendency to rise as the attained age of the policyholder increases, even in
level-premium policies.
J. BELTH, THE RETAIL PRICE STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE 34-35 (1966).
See also Belth, Life Insurance Price Measurement, 57 Ky. L.J. 687, 690-92 (1969);
Belth, Price Disclosure in Life Insurance, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 1054, 1063. It is also
interesting to note that the cost per $1,000 of the protection element of whole life
insurance is not necessarily less than that of term insurance. J. BELTH, THE RETAIL
PRICE STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE 104-09 (1966). For the method of
calculating the cost of the protection element for any given year, see id. at 35-38,
J. BELTH, LIFE INSURANCE: A CONSUMERS' HANDBOOK 35-36, 234 (1973), and two
articles by the same author, 57 Ky. L.J. 687, 689-90 (1969); 1972 Wis. L. REV. 1054,
1064-66.
52. See Mulligan, supra note 47, at 74.
53. Over 78,000 people in the United States were age 95 or over in 1970. U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1970, 1 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
POPULATION, PT. 1. UNITED STATES SUMMARY, § 1, at 265, Appendix B, at A-14. No
figures are available for those age 96 and over.
54. When a policy matures, its cash value equals its face value. Thus, there is no
protection element of the policy remaining after maturity. The age at which a policy
matures is determined by mortality tables. Policies issued before 1947 were based on
a mortality table on which the maximum age was 95. Policies today are written on a
table of mortality in which the maximum age is 99. See J. MACLEAN, supra note 10, at
71-76; LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK at 104-05. Therefore, today's whole life policies
will mature when the insured reaches age 100. There are still a number of people,
however, that live beyond age 100. The 1970 census estimated the number of persons
age 100 and over to be 5,000. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 53.
55. See note 131 and accompanying text infra.
364
Community Property Life Insurance
life-long contract.56 More recently, authorities have come to recognize
that a premium is a condition precedent to the formation of a unilat-
eral insurance contract. 57 It also has been observed that the existence
of some rights, such as dividends and cash value, date from the time
of the first premium payment. 58 Although this observation is correct,
it is no more profound than acknowledging that one's right to a bank
savings deposit and the interest thereon is dependent on the length of
time the deposit has been in the bank. The crucial distinction missed
by supporters of the continuous contract theory is that the promise of
the life insurance contract for protection dates only from the most
recent premium payment. 59
B. The Apportionment Rule and Its Application to Life Insurance
Under both the Spanish and the American community property sys-
tems, all that is earned or acquired during marriage is presumed to be
property of the community, shared equally by each spouse.60 In both
Spain and the United States community property jurisdictions, prop-
erty owned before marriage remains the separate property of each
spouse after marriage.6 1 If a spouse sells his or her separate property
during coverture and uses the proceeds of the sale to make other ac-
quisitions, the acquired property is also separate.62 "Separate property
continues to be separate through changes and transitions, so long as it
56. A condition subsequent has been defined as "any fact the existence or occur-
rence of which, by agreement of the parties, operates to discharge a duty of perform-
ance after it has become absolute." J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 27, at 227-
29. See W. VANCE, supra note 47, at 297-98; Comment, supra note 47, at 324-25;
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham, 93 U.S. 24, 30 (1876). See also J. APPLEMAN,
supra note 15, § 8071, and cases cited therein; 6 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSUR-
ANcE LAW § 31.12, at 14-16 (2d ed. 1961), and cases cited therein.
57. See notes 23 & 28 and accompanying text supra. See also Bankers Nat'l Life
Ins. Co. v. Cooper, I 11 N.J. Super. 264, 268 A.2d 78, 83 (1970).
58. Comment, supra note 47, at 324.
59. It must be emphasized that an insured does not renew $10,000 worth of
protection each year on a cash value policy with a face value of $10,000. In fact,
he only renews $10,000 less the cash value; if the annual premium is not paid he re-
mains entitled to the cash value whether or not he dies. Thus, the cash value exists
independent of future premium payments. Payment of the premium entitles one to
(1) a small increase in cash value and (2) the amount of actual insurance protection
for the coming year, which is the difference between the face value and cash value
of the policy. See note 15 supra.
60. See DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN § 66.
61. Id. § 77.
62. Id.
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can be clearly traced and identified. ' 63 This principle is known as the
source doctrine and is used to overcome the presumption that an asset
acquired during marriage is community property.64
The apportionment doctrine is an extension of the source doctrine.
Under this doctrine when property is acquired partially with commu-
nity funds and partially with separate funds, the asset is both commu-
nity and separate property in proportion to the amount contributed
from each fund.65 Arizona, California, Idaho and Washington follow
the apportionment doctrine in varying degrees. 66
1. Analogy to other types of property
The apportionment rule has been applied to life insurance policies
in California and Washington. Courts of both states have relied upon
their previous use of the apportionment rule in cases involving tan-
gible property to justify its application to life insurance policies in
which premiums had been paid with both community and separate
funds.
The problem of the ownership of life insurance proceeds in such
circumstances was first considered by a California probate court in
Estate of Webb 67 in 1875. In Webb one annual premium on an en-
dowment policy 68 had been paid from the insured's separate funds
before marriage and two annual premiums had been paid from com-
63. In re Brown's Estate, 124 Wash. 273, 276, 214 P. 10, II (1903). See also
DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN § 77.
64. Cross, supra note 19, at 767.
65. Such apportionment may have occurred under the Spanish system, for it was
used in other earlier European community property systems. DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN at
184 n.27 and accompanying text. In United States community property jurisdictions,
such separation into community and separate proportions is not uniformly favored.
Id. § 64, at 133-34; § 68.2, at 152; § 77, at 185. The apportionment doctrine is es-
pecially favored if acquisition is initiated before marriage and completed during mar-
riage, id. § 64, at 133-34, or initiated during marriage and completed after its termin-
ation. Id. § 68.2, at 152.
66. Id. at 133-34, 152.
67. Myr. Prob. 93 (Cal. 1875). The complete text of the court's analysis is as
follows:
The consideration upon which the insurance company promised to pay the
policy, was the payment of the yearly premiums. Those premiums were paid,
one-third out of the separate property and two-thirds out of the common prop-
erty. It legitimately follows that the proceeds of the policy belong to the re-
spective funds from which the payments were made, viz: one-third to the sep-
arate property, and two-thirds to the common property.
68. An endowment policy is a variety of cash value insurance. See note 14 supra.
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munity funds after marriage. The designated beneficiary was the in-
sured's estate. Upon his death, the court divided the proceeds of the
policy, finding one-third to be separate property and two-thirds com-
munity property. The court reasoned that because the consideration
for the policy was the payment of premiums from both separate and
community funds, the ownership of the policy and, therefore, the poli-
cy's proceeds, should reflect the sources of the consideration. This rea-
soning is based upon the principle that separate and community es-
tates share ownership in property pro rata according to the respective
proportions of the total consideration paid by each estate. 69 Subse-
quently in Modern Woodmen of America v. Gray,70 a California
court of appeals applied the apportionment doctrine to life insurance,
basing its holding in part upon Vieux v. Vieux,7 1 in which the doc-
trine was held applicable to realty purchased with both separate and
community funds.
In Washington application of the apportionment doctrine to life
insurance evolved in several discrete steps. Initially, the Washington
Supreme Court applied the doctrine to tangible property.72 Subse-
quently, the court held that life insurance proceeds were property.73
In 1938 the court in In re Coffey's Estate74 appeared to conclude that
the apportionment doctrine applied to life insurance. The sole issue in
Coffey's Estate however, was the extent to which the insurance pro-
ceeds were subject to the inheritance tax, and the court's analysis of
the apportionment rule in the insurance context consisted of a single
sentence of questionable authority.75 Nevertheless, the Washington
69. See DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN § 64, at 133-34.
70. 113 Cal. App. 729, 299 P. 754 (1931). This case has been followed and cited
by the California appellate courts but never has been accepted explicitly by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court. See, e.g., Polk v. Polk, 228 Cal. App. 2d 763, 39 Cal. Rptr.
824 (1964); Gettman v. City of Los Angeles, 87 Cal. App. 2d 862, 197 P.2d 817
(1948); McBride v. McBride, I 1 Cal. App. 2d 521, 54 P.2d 480 (1936).
71. 80 Cal. App. 222, 251 P. 640 (1926).
72. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Hoitt, 119 Wash. 283, 287, 205 P. 414, 416 (1922). See
generally Cross, supra note 19, at 748.
73. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74 P.2d 27 (1937),
in which the court held that a policy paid for with community funds gave the wife a
vested interest in its proceeds because such proceeds constitute property.
74. 195 Wash. 379,81 P.2d 283 (1938).
75. The Coffey court concluded that Washington's former application of the
source doctrine to tangible property provided a reason to apply such an approach to
life insurance. The court's analysis of the issue, in its entirety, was that "[t] he sep-
arate character of the property continues so long as it can be clearly traced and iden-
tified." Id. at 385, 81 P.2d at 286. Not only was there no analysis of the applicability
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Supreme Court expressly adopted the apportionment rule for life in-
surance nine years later in Small v. Bartyzel.76 In Small premiums on
a group term policy had been paid with separate funds before mar-
riage and with community funds thereafter. On the insured's death,
claimants under each estate sought the proceeds. In concluding that
the proceeds should be apportioned, the, court reasoned that the wife
had obtained a vested property interest in the policy through the ex-
penditure of community funds for premiums. Therefore, the court re-
jected the inception of title rule and held that the wife was entitled to
claim her proportionate share of the proceeds. 77 This holding also
implicitly assumed that the separate estate obtained a vested interest
in the proceeds by reason of its premium payments.78 Thus, in
applying the apportionment rule the court treated life insurance as it
had treated tangible property.79
of the source doctrine to life insurance, but the court cited the wrong case as author-
ity for the doctrine. The case cited, Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309, 166 P. 634
(1917), involved the wife's vested interest in community property; the court held
that community property cannot be subjected to execution to satisfy a separate judg-
ment against the husband for his personal torts. The case which the Coffey court
intended to use as authority for the source doctrine was In re Brown's Estate, 124
Wash. 273, 214 P. 10 (1923). This is evident from the discussion of the apportion-
ment doctrine in respondent's brief. Brief for Respondent at 28-30, In re Coffey's
Estate, 195 Wash. 379, 81 P.2d 283 (1938). In addition, virtually the same sentence
quoted by the court in Coffey is found in Brown's Estate, but not in Schramm. 124
Wash. at 276, 214 P. at 11.
76. 27 Wn. 2d 176, 177 P.2d 391 (1947).
77. The court relied on Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74
P.2d 27 (1937), for two propositions: (1) the payment of premiums from com-
munity funds gives the community a vested interest in the policy proceeds; and (2)
a beneficiary designation under the portion of the policy paid from community funds
is void without consent of the wife.
78. This assumes the presumption that the policy is completely community prop-
erty could be overcome. See text accompanying note 60 supra. The presumption is
overcome by proving the number of premiums paid by the separate estate prior to
marriage. For a discussion of the community property presumption and means to
overcome it, see DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN §§ 60-61.
79. An idiosyncrasy of the apportionment rule as applied to life insurance war-
rants mention. Under this doctrine, previously accumulated interests in a group term
policy can be cut off if the insured's employer replaces master policies. For example,
if an employee pays 10 premiums with separate funds, marries and pays 10 addition-
al premiums before death, the apportionment rule would characterize the proceeds
as one-half community and one-half separate. If, however, his employer had changed
policies after five of the initial separate payments, two-thirds of the proceeds would
be allocated to the community. This change of master policies occurred in Small
even though the subsequent master policy involved the same insurance company and
there was no lapse of protection. 27 Wn. 2d at 178, 177 P.2d at 392. The court.
however, did not discuss the resultant changed characterization of ownership. Evi-
dently both separate and community estates can be divested of interests in a policy by
factors completely beyond the parties' control, even though the insured is continuous-
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As the rule has evolved in California and Washington, it has been
misapplied to life insurance because the courts have failed to consider
that each annual premium pays for both a permanent cumulative asset
and a temporary noncumulative asset. Because only the cash value is
a cumulative asset, it alone can be apportioned according to the con-
tributions of the separate and community estates. In contrast, the
temporary noncumulative asset purchased by the policyowner is pro-
tection against the risk of death.80 The portion of each premium at-
tributable to the purchase of protection is generally not capable of
apportionment.81
2. The right to keep the insurance policy in force
In a frequently-cited case, Modern Woodmen of America v.
Gray,8 2 a California appellate court argued that the apportionment
doctrine reflected the value of the right of the insured to keep his
insurance policy in effect past the time when he could not obtain a
new policy from the same company. The court stited:83
[I] t was only by virtue of his having obtained the certificate of insur-
ance prior to his marriage and his having regularly paid the premiums
thereon in the meantime that he was entitled to continue to enjoy the
protection afforded by the certificate' . . . [H] e had acquired the
right to have the contract of insurance continued in force by virtue of
the payment of premiums from its issuance to him in 1898 until the
date of his second marriage in 1923. This was a valuable right in the
eyes of the law ....
Thus the court felt that the apportionment doctrine fairly compen-
sated the separate estate for the "valuable right" of being able to keep
the policy in force.
ly protected and, in fact, is unaware that the employer has changed master policies.
The employer has complete control over such "vested" interests of the respective es-
tates.
80. Thus, a life insurance contract is not analogous to an installment contract
for the purchase of tangible property. A life insurance premium buys the whole of a
product (insurance protection) for a limited period of time, whereas a payment on
an installment contract buys a fractional interest in a product for an essentially un-
limited period of time. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
81. The risk portion may be apportioned if the last payment was composed of
traceable percentages of both separate and community funds. See note 122 and ac-
companying text infra.
82. 113 Cal. App. 729, 299 P. 754 (1931).
83. 299 P. at 755.
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The court's argument fails for several reasons. First, the apportion-
ment doctrine is based upon the assumption that uninsurability occurs
during the period the prior estate paid premiums because it awards
that estate a sum of money for the insurability right. However, it is
more common that as a person grows older, the likelihood of uninsur-
ability increases accordingly. Thus, the insured spouse more likely will
become uninsurable during the period when the subsequent estate is
paying premiums than when the previous estate was paying premi-
ums. 84 Second, the apportionment rule rests on the assumption that life
84. The following example illustrates the analytical flaws of the Gray decision.
Assume that a man acquired a $10,000 life insurance policy while single, paid seven
annual premiums prior to marriage, and paid the final three annual premiums after
marriage with community funds before he died. Three further situations can be
posited: (1) the man became uninsurable one year after purchasing the policy; (2)
the man did not become uninsurable before he died; or (3) the man became uninsur-
able after marriage and before death.
In the first situation, under the apportionment rule, $7,000 of the proceeds are
characterized as the husband's separate property and $3,000 are characterized as
community property, of which $1,500 may be controlled by the husband. In Californ-
ia the husband could dispose of his half interest in the community portion of the life
insurance policy through beneficiary designation. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of
Italy, 60 Cal. App. 602, 214 P. 61 (1923). A husband in Washington, the other state
that has adopted the apportionment theory, could dispose of his half interest in the
community life insurance policy to a beneficiary other than his wife, without her
consent, only if his estate were the beneficiary. In re Towey's Estate, 22 Wn. 2d 212,
155 P.2d 273 (1945). Therefore, when the husband died the wife could get only
$1,500 of the $10,000 policy, even though the community was paying for the pro-
tection at the time of his death. The proponents of the apportionment rule view the
existence of the right of insurability as justification for the husband's control of up to
$8,500 of the proceeds.
In the second situation, the husband's continued insurability renders the right to
continued insurance (subsequent to becoming uninsurable) worthless as he could
have dropped the present policy at any time and passed a physical examination for
another policy. Although no valuable right of insurability was brought into the mar-
riage, the separate estate is compensated under the apportionment rule as if there
were such a right. The community estate is, according to the aforementioned justifica-
tion, paying the separate estate for rights the community could have as easily ac-
quired.
In the third situation, if either estate should be compensated for the right of insur-
ability, it should be the community estate as it kept the policy alive immediately after
the husband became uninsurable. Nevertheless, the apportionment rule would char-
acterize $7,000 as separate property and $3,000 as community property. See note
108 and accompanying text infra.
It may be argued that the contractual right to keep an insurance policy in force is
still valuable to the insured at the time of marriage even if no uninsurability is in-
volved. This argument rests on the rationale that the insured gains a valuable right
if he takes out a policy early in his life, for he has the "right" to keep his insurance
in force for lower premiums than a person who buys the same policy years later. If
one begins coverage at age 25 rather than age 35, premiums indeed may be lower,
but the insured will have paid for the policy ten years longer than a person starting
at age 35. Whether one pays less per payment over a longer period of time or more
per payment over a shorter period of time is solely a matter of personal preference.
Starting an insurance plan at a younger age means only that "the company intends
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insurance cannot be obtained at the regular rate by one who is unin-
surable. This is not always true. Most group and credit85 life insur-
ance plans do not require evidence of insurability for participation. 86
Finally, it is clear that the apportionment doctrine does not result in a
constant valuation of the insurability right. Under the apportionment
rule, the insurability right actually decreases in value annually,87
to collect a lower premium over a longer period of time." G. REYNOLDS, supra note
15, at 111. See also J. BELTH, LIFE INSURANCE: A CONSUMERS' HANDBOOK 17 (1972);
N. DACEY, WHAT'S WRONG WITH YOUR LIFE INSURANCE 200-01 (1963).
Insurance may actually be cheaper when bought later in life because those who
buy it later have saved the cost of the earlier years of protection. This saving may
easily offset the higher premium rates of a policy beginning at a later date. For ex-
ample, imagine a pair of twins, A and B. Assume A took out a $10,000 whole life
policy at age 25 and B took out the same type policy at age 35. If it is assumed that
B deposited in his bank savings account at least the same amount per year that A
paid in policy premiums and that B received a conservative 4% after-tax compound
interest rate, B's savings would total more than $1,600 by age 35. Four percent an-
nual interest on this sum more than offsets the increase in premium cost over the
preceeding ten years. In addition, at age 35, B will have bank savings twice as large
as A will have in cash value, and if B dies, his heirs would not only receive $10,000
from the insurance company, but would get his bank account as well. This example
will work to B's benefit with an after-tax interest rate of as low as 3.5%. For pre-
mium and cash value figures, see BEST'S FLITCRAFT COMPEND, supra note 41, at 152,155.
The purpose of this example has been to show that because B has had the use of
his money for ten more years than A, B has benefited to a greater extent than he sub-
sequently has been forced to pay in higher insurance costs. There may have been
other ways in which B could have used his money during the ten years and received
benefits which would have outweighed the detriment of the increased cost of insur-
ance at age 35. If the insured is insurable at the later date, he or she is no better off
(and may be worse off) starting an insurance program at a younger age. Therefore,
the prior estate should not be compensated for a fanciful "right of low premium pay-
ments." If the insured was uninsurable before marriage, or the courts wish to value
the right of insurability regardless of individual insurability, the value of this right
can be calculated in a more precise manner than the apportionment rule allows. See
note 114 infra.
85. Credit life is term insurance issued through a lender to cover payment of a
loan or other obligations in case of death. LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK at 115.
86. It has been observed:
Employees who are otherwise uninsurable may be covered under a group
contract because the group is underwritten (i.e., its insurability is judged and
the terms of the contract, including rates, fixed) as a unit.
The insurer is concerned with average results for the group and can accept
the poorer-than-average individual risk if the group as a whole is acceptable.
A. MowBRAY, R. BLANCHARD, & C. WILLIAMS, JR., supra note 15, at 350. See J. APPLE-
MAN, supra note 15, § 44, at 60; J. BELTH, LIFE INSURANCE: A CONSUMER'S HANDBOOK
90 (1973); 19 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 82:11 (2d ed. 1968);
Gregg, Fundamental Characteristics of Group Insurance, in LIFE AND HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE HANDBOOK 351, 352 (3d ed. D. Gregg & V. Lucas 1973); Williams, Group Life
Insurance, in id. 372, 377. See also note 108 infra. Group life and credit life account
for over 47% of the total face amount of insurance in force in the United States.
LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK at 22.
87. In the ten-year example used in note 84 supra, the insurability right was worth
7/7 of the policy proceeds ($10,000) before the marriage, 7/8 ($8,750) after one year
of marriage, 7/9 ($7,778) after two years, and 7/10 ($7,000) after three years.
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whereas it would seem that the insurability right should at least re-
main constant, if not increase, as time passes.
3. Influence offederal estate tax treasury regulations
A prior treasury regulation 88 provided a justification for use of the
apportionment rule. The United States Supreme Court in Lang v.
Commissioner8 9 applied the apportionment rule to allocate the pro-
ceeds of a Washington couple's life insurance policy for federal estate
tax purposes. The Court concluded that the treasury regulation man-
dated its application. Subsequently, in In re Coffey's Estate9" the
Washington Supreme Court followed Lang. However, the court did
not discuss the appropriateness of applying a federal estate tax rule to
state community property questions of life insurance policy ownership
between spouses.91 Interestingly, the federal apportionment rule was
later abandoned by the federal government because Congress deemed
it to be unfair. 92
III. A PROPOSED RULE: THE RISK PAYMENT
DOCTRINE
A. The Risk Payment Doctrine and Term Insurance
Under the risk payment doctrine, the source of funds (i.e., commu-
88. Treas. Reg. 70, T.D. 3918, 28 TREAS. DEC. INT. REV. 427, 456-58 (1926),
quoted in Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264, 269 (1938), read, in part, as follows:
[Art. 25] Where a portion of the premiums were paid by the beneficiary and the
remaining portion by the decedent the insurance will be deemed to have been
taken out by the latter in the proportion that the premiums paid by him bear to
the total of premiums paid.
[Art. 281 [W]here the proceeds [of the policy are payable to a beneficiary other
than the decedent's estate] and only a portion of the premiums were paid by the
decedent, the amount to be listed on [Schedule C of the return] is that proportion
of the insurance receivable which the premiums paid by the decedent bears to the
total premiums paid.
89. 304 U.S. 264 (1938).
90. 195 Wash. 379, 81 P.2d 283 (1938). See text accompanying notes 74-75 supra.
91. This deficiency was criticized immediately after the Coffey decision. See Com-
ment, supra note 47, at 324.
92. See S. REP. No. 1622. 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1954), quoted in 2 J. MERTENS.
THE LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 17.01 n.1 (1959); 7 J. RABKIN &
M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 2042, at 3216-17 (1963).
Congress has subsequently refused to reinstate the rule. H.R. REP. No. 8381. 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 56 (1957). See also Brown & Sherman, Transfers in Contemplation
of Death, 101 TRUSTS & ESTATES 790, 844 (1962).
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nity or separate) paying for protection at the time of the insured's
death determines the characterization of the proceeds of a term policy
as community or separate property. An example illustrates the impact
of this proposed rule. Assume that a person age 25 took out a
$10,000 term policy while single, paid premiums on the policy for
seven years with separate funds, married, paid premiums for three
years with community funds, and then died. Under the risk payment
doctrine, the proceeds of the policy would be characterized as com-
munity because the community paid for the insurance protection ex-
isting when the insured died. Application of the risk payment doctrine,
therefore, would create an interest in the noninsured spouse of
$5,000,93 or one-half of the community property. In contrast, the ap-
portionment doctrine would limit the interest of the noninsured spouse
to $1,500, 94 and the inception of title doctrine would provide only
$90 (one-half of the last three premiums).95
The risk payment doctrine has several advantages over the incep-
tion of title and apportionment rules. First, it treats life insurance as a
unique type of property. As suggested above, 6 life insurance should
be regarded as property which is repurchased yearly and which
cannot cumulate interest except for its cash value. The ownership
characteristics of term life insurance differ from those of other types
of property. One author, speaking in the context of group term poli-
cies, stated:97
93. This means that regardless of the beneficiary designation on the policy, the non-
insured spouse has an absolute right to $5000, one-half of the proceeds. Of course,
under all three rules the insured spouse may validly designate the noninsured spouse to
receive a portion or all of the insured spouse's interest in the proceeds, in addition to
the noninsured spouse's interest.
94. This is the correct figure under California law whether the insured made his
estate or a third party (other than his spouse) the beneficiary. In Washington, this figure
is correct only if the beneficiary is the insured's estate. If the beneficiary is a third per-
son (other than the noninsured spouse), the figure would be $3000. See note 84 supra.
95. The total premiums paid for three years on the individual $ 10,000 nonpartici-
pating five-year renewable and convertible term policy contemplated in this example
range from less than $130 to more than $200, depending upon the company from
which the insurance is purchased. See A Guide to Life Insurance: Pt. 1, 39 CONSUMER
REPORTS 35, 49-50 (1974). In order to comprehend the impact of acceptance of the
risk payment doctrine and its application to term insurance, it should be noted that
almost 63% of the total amount of insurance in force in the United States is term in-
surance. Group term alone accounts for over 41% of the insurance in force. These
percentages are continuing to increase annually. LiFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK at 22,
24-25.
96. See Part I supra.
97. D. GREGG, GROUP LIFE INSURANCE 83 (3d ed. 1962) (emphasis added). An-
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An employee who terminates has had the benefit of the protection
and has no further equity in the plan to be accounted for or to be ad-
ministered. . . . [T] he plan can easily be changed or terminated by
the employer and the insurance company if necessary, since there are
no vested interests to be disturbed.
Term life insurance, then, is an aleatory contract, providing the in-
sured with protection for a specified period but creating no vested
property rights in the traditional sense.98 The risk payment doctrine
incorporates this concept.
The risk payment doctrine correctly treats term insurance as a se-
ries of unilateral contracts, rather than as one bilateral contract. As
previously indicated, each premium payment is both the condition
precedent to and the consideration necessary for the insurance compa-
ny's promise to pay a benefit upon the death of the insured.
The risk payment doctrine also treats life insurance in a manner
consistent with community property principles. The analogy of life
insurance to community funded improvements on separately owned
land is not appropriate. When dealing with life insurance, the better
community property analysis would require newly acquired property
to assume the same character as the property used for its acquisition.
Because life insurance protection is reacquired annually, each year's
protection should be characterized in accordance with the fund used
to pay that year's premium.
Several state courts have recognized the unique nature of term in-
surance99 and the applicability of the risk payment doctrine to it. Ari-
other author noted:
Most of the group life insurance in force is on the -year renewable-term plan.
This plan is the most popular because it is simple and its cost is low. It is well
adapted to the insurance of employees who form a fluctuating group, since ad-
justments of premiums on account of new entrants and withdrawals are easily
made and there are no accumulated equities to be adjusted.
J. MACLEAN, supra note 10, at 381 (emphasis added).
98. Thus, one author's description of a group disability policy also applies to term
life insurance. "Such protection is peculiarly designed to meet future needs, is essen-
tially 'instantaneously' available by reason of current employment and not acquired
over a time span." Cross, supra note 19, at 758-59 n.135.
99. Concerning an individual term policy, one court seemed to accept the follow-
ing contention as true:
[TIhe chief difficulty with its [annual renewable term] policy from the com-
pany's standpoint is that, there being no cash value built up, the policyholder has
nothing to lose by permitting the policy to lapse and buying a similar policy else-
where, and such lapses are encouraged by agents who are interested in earning
additional first-year premiums.
Survivors Benefit Ins. Co. v. Farmer, 514 S.W.2d 565, 567 (Mo. 1974).
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zona appellate courts have explicitly adopted it for term insurance
policies, 100 although the rule for cash value policies remains the incep-
tion of title doctrine.' 0 ' One of these courts remarked: "[t] he fact
that the husband's separate estate paid a premium for a risk long since
expired without loss should not give his separate estate any vested in-
terest in the proceeds."'1 2 The Texas Supreme Court has also invoked
the doctrine. 103 In Small v. Bartyzel, 04 in which Washington adopted
100. Gaethje v. Gaethje, 7 Ariz. App. 544, 441 P.2d 579 (1968); Lock v. Lock, 8
Ariz. App. 138, 444 P.2d 163 (1968). In Gaethje the husband acquired a group term
life insurance policy in 1947 during his second marriage, the premiums for which pre-
sumably were paid monthly. In 1952 he divorced his second wife and remarried her in
1953. He died while married and covered by the policy in 1966. The designated bene-
ficiary was a son by a former marriage. The court held that the proceeds of the policy
were all community property despite the fact that some payments were made on the
policy while he was single. This conclusion was reached because the community was
paying for the risk under which the insured died. Furthermore, the court held that the
wife was the victim of constructive fraud by the husband's designation (without the
wife's consent) of the son as beneficiary to the extent that she did not receive one-half
the value of the community property (including life insurance proceeds) at his death.
In Lock the husband and his first wife were divorced in 1961. In 1962 he changed the
beneficiary of his group term policy, which had been in effect continuously since be-
fore his divorce, to his second wife. He died in 1963. The first wife then claimed, inter
alia, that because the policy had once been community property, upon divorce it was
owned by the former spouses as tenants in common and that the former husband could
not designate a third person as beneficiary without her consent. The court, quoting
Gaetlhje, held that the community had paid for a risk long since expired without loss
and that the husband's post-divorce funds "paid for all of the coverage that resulted at
the time of Mr. Lock's death." 444 P.2d at 170.
101. See Rothman v. Rumbeck, 54 Ariz. 443, 96 P.2d 755 (1939). See also Ever-
son v. Everson, 24 Ariz. App. 239, 537 P.2d 624, 628-29 (1975), in which the court
said that because the husband had paid premiums on a cash value policy before mar-
riage, the trial court's designation of the policy as community property was erroneous.
102. Gaethje, 441 P.2d at 585.
103. In Sherman v. Roe, 153 Tex. 1, 262 S.W.2d 393 (1953), the husband was
issued a certificate of insurance under his employer's master group accidental death
policy. The husband paid premiums on his insurance for approximately six and one-
half years before marriage and four and one-half years after marriage. After three
years of marriage the face amount of the policy was increased from $2,000 to $9,000.
At the time that the couple was simultaneously killed in an aircraft accident, the wife
was the beneficiary under the policy. The court ruled that the proceeds were commu-
nity property:
Whatever rights to the proceeds of the insurance might accrue to [the husband]
as his separate property on account of his having procured the insurance for $2,000
before his marriage to [the wife] or by his payments of premiums before his mar-
riage to her in our opinion passed to the community when, after his marriage to
[her], he paid the premiums out of community funds, made her the beneficiary,
and increased the amount of the insurance to $9,000. Under this state of facts the
ownership of the proceeds of the certificate is to be determined in the same way
as if the certificate had been issued after [the husband and'wife] were married and
all premiums paid out of community funds.
262 S.W.2d at 397.
Several commentators have viewed the case as indicating that the Texas Supreme
Court might have accepted the risk payment doctrine for term insurance cases. Profes-
sor Huie observed:
375
Washington Law Review
the apportionment rule, Chief Justice Mallery dissented, arguing that
the court should recognize that the "full value for all the monthly
premiums except the last one was received by way of the protection
enjoyed by the assured during the periods for which they were
paid."'105 There has been surprisingly little discussion of the risk pay-
ment doctrine by commentators. 106
The risk payment approach also is fairer than the other doctrines in
valuation of the insurability right. Under the inception of title rule
insurability is not a factor, and the apportionment doctrine rests on
the faulty assumption that uninsurability occurs during the period
when the previous estate was paying for the policy. The risk payment
doctrine, however, rests on a more plausible assumption, i.e., that the
insured spouse is more likely to become uninsurable while the subse-
quent estate is paying premiums than when the previous estate was
paying them.107 Accordingly, the risk payment doctrine denies the
previous estate any compensation for insurability. 10 8
When term insurance is being renewed periodically, the transactions can properly
be analyzed as the formation of a new contract as each renewal occurs. If that
was the case in Sherman v. Roe, as it seems to have been, the court was entirely
justified in treating the contract in controversy as one that was formed during the
* * .marriage and paid for entirely with ... community funds.
Huie, Community Property and Life Insurance-Substantive Aspects-Developments
in Texas, 2 TEXAS INST. 104, 128 (1957). See also S. SCOVILLE, COMMUNITY PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN LIFE INSURANCE 103 (1969); Note, 18 Sw. L.J. 521 n.2 (1964); Note, 42
TEXAS L. REV. 747, 750 & n.24 (1964). The inception of title rule was adopted in Texas
ten years later for use with cash value policies. See note 22 and accompanying text
supra.
104. 27 Wn. 2d 176, 177 P.2d 391 (1947).
105. Id. at 185, 177 P.2d at 395 (Mallery, J., dissenting).
106. See Gilchrist, Washington Disinherits the Non-Native Wife, 46 WASH. L. REV.
283, 295-95 & n.66 (1971) (risk payment doctrine discussed in one paragraph and a
footnote); Huie, supra note 103, at 104, 109-10, 217-28 (1957) (risk payment doc-
trine discussed in two paragraphs); Jackson, Community Property and Federal Taxes,
12 Sw. L.J. 1, 44 (1958)(risk payment doctrine discussed in one paragraph); Note.
18 Sw. L.J. 521 n.2 (1964)(risk payment doctrine discussed in a footnote); Note, 42
TEXAS L. REV. 747, 750 & n.24 (1964)(risk payment doctrine discussed in one para-
graph and a footnote).
107. See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
108. The majority of people in the United States are not uninsurable. Less than
three percent of those who apply for life insurance are turned down for health rea-
sons. In addition, five percent of the total number of applicants for life insurance are
insurable at a rate higher than the standard rate, mainly because of some medical
reason. LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK at 91-92. The actual number of uninsurable per-
sons in the population is probably greater than three percent, however, because the in-
firm and aged may not apply for life insurance on the assumption that they would be
unable to obtain it.
It should be noted also that most group term and credit life insurance is issued with-
out evidence of insurability. Gregg, Fundamental Characteristics of Group Insurance,
in LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE HANDBOOK 351, 352 (3d ed. D. Gregg & V. Lucas
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There is current support for the risk payment doctrine's denial of
reimbursement to the previous estate for the insurability right. Both
state109 and federal'1 0 governments have recognized that for estate,
gift, and inheritance tax purposes insurability is not a factor in deter-
mining the value of a life insurance policy. Insurability is too difficult
to value. In the divorce-property disposition context, the courts also
have not attempted to value the insurability right; instead they have
looked only to the cash value."' Therefore, if courts do not value in-
surability for tax and property settlement purposes, they should not
purport to do so when characterizing insurance proceeds as either
separate or community.
However, if courts choose to value insurability, the risk payment
doctrine can be modified to accommodate this purpose. This could be
accomplished in a number of ways. A court could assume that every
insured is uninsurable at the time he brings his policy into the marital
1973); Huey, Individual Insurance Marketing, in id. 964, 974; Williams, Group Life
Insurance, in id. 372, 379. See notes 85 & 86 and accompanying text supra. Group life
and credit life insurance accounted for more than 47% of the face amount of all life
insurance in force in the United States at the end of 1974. LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK
at 22. Considering the fact that the incidence of group life insurance is growing at a
faster rate than that of cash value insurance, the majority of insurance issued in the
future in the United States may be issued without evidence of insurability.
109. At the death of the noninsured spouse, the noninsured spouse's one-half in-
terest in a policy purchased with community funds is, for state inheritance tax pur-
poses, measured by the value of one-half of the cash surrender value. No value is
given to any right of insurability. See In re Mendenhall's Estate, 182 Cal. App. 2d
441, 6 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1960); In re Leuthold's Estate, 52 Wn. 2d 299, 324 P.2d 1103
(1958); Thompson v. Calvert, 301 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
110. At the death of the noninsured spouse, the noninsured spouse's one-half in-
terest in a policy purchased with community funds is, for federal estate tax purposes,
one-half of the interpolated terminal reserve value of the policy as determined under
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8 (1974). Rev. Rul. 75-100, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 12, at
15. No value is given to any right of insurability. See also note 139 infra (federal gov-
ernment is not willing to value insurability); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-6 (1974)(gift tax);
G. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. McCoRD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES § 18.35, at
545 (3d ed. 1974). But see James S. Pritchard, 4 T.C. 204 (1944).
111. See, e.g., Wills v. Wills, 50Wn. 2d 439, 441, 312 P.2d 661, 662 (1957); Pol-
lock v. Pollock, 7 Wn. App. 394, 403, 499 P.2d 231, 237 (1972). Upon divorce some
courts value the noninsured spouse's portion of a community property life insurance
policy at one-half the cash value. No attempt has been made at valuing the insurabil-
ity right of the insured, or even recognizing that there is such a right. See Milhan v.
Milhan, 13 Cal. 3d 129, 132-33, 528 P.2d 1145, 1147, 117 Cal. Rptr. 809, 811 (1974);
Arnold v. Arnold, 76 Cal. 2d 877, 174 P.2d 674, 679 (1946); Womack v. Womack,
141 Tex. 299, 172 S.W.2d 307, 308 (1943); Locke v. Locke, 143 S.W.2d 637, 638
(Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Russell v. Russell, 79 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
Where the policy is without cash value, no value has been assigned to the policy upon
divorce. See Smith v. Succession of Smith, 298 So. 2d 146, 149 (La. App. 1974). Other
courts which have measured the community interest in life insurance policies at divorce
have neither recognized nor valued the insurability right. See note 127 infra.
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community.112 Upon death, it could then compensate the separate es-
tate by allocating to it a fixed percentage of the proceeds, for instance,
ten percent. 113 This approach is simple and avoids a trial on the insur-
112. For purposes of this discussion of insurability, it is assumed that the prior
estate is the separate estate and the subsequent estate is the community estate. This
has been the most common fact pattern. However, the discussion also can be applied
to the converse situation, i.e., where the prior estate is community and the subsequent
estate is separate.
113. This figure represents a suggested value of the insurability right in a term pol-
icy valued at its cost to the policyholder. This is the cost of renewability and converti-
bility options contained in the term policy, which options allow one to maintain cov-
erage regardless of any future deterioration in his health. Although selection of the
ten percent figure is arbitrary, it is not without a reasonable basis. In arriving at this
figure, both the costs of renewability and convertibility for term insurance policies were
considered.
To determine the cost of renewability, the author compared the published premium
rates of term policies having only a convertibility feature with those having both re-
newability and convertibility features. See BEST'S FLITCRAFT COMPEND, supra note 41.
which lists seven companies that publish their rates for convertible only and for re-
newable and convertible level term policies. The average difference of premium rates
was four percent, which indicates the cost of those companies' renewability options.
Id. at 190, 416, 470, 492, 518, 716, 742. Nonparticipating policies (ones which do not
pay dividends) were chosen for this price comparison because of the possibility that
premiums on participating policies may only partially reflect the necessary costs of
renewability and convertibility, a portion of those costs being reflected in the amount
of annual dividends paid. See J. Higbee, Survey of Actuaries Regarding Renewability
and Convertibility Costs in Term Life Insurance Policies 3. 21, 25, 37. 40, 46 (1975)
(unpublished collection of responses to a questionnaire mailed to actuaries of the 80
largest life insurance companies in the United States, on file in the University of Wash-
ington Law Library) [hereinafter cited as Survey]. Interestingly, the average cost of
renewability as a percentage of premium, as reported by the insurance companies sur-
veyed, was also four per cent. Survey at 19, 25, 43, 47. However, it is not necessarily
true that premiums for a renewable policy are greater than those for a nonrenewable
policy. A renewable policy may be less expensive because it provides a longer period
of time over which to amortize acquisition costs. Survey at 10. 16. 46 (appendix I. at
18-19).
Convertibility costs were more difficult to obtain. Because few companies sell policies
without convertibility features, a comparison of term policy rates was inadequate for
determining the cost of convertibility. Actuaries' replies to the author's questionnaire.
however, did yield definite figures. Their reports of convertibility costs, as an average of
premium payments, ranged from zero to eleven per cent and averaged five per cent.
Survey at iv, 4, 19, 20, 25, 36, 43, 47. The company reporting a zero cost of converti-
bility assumed "that when a term policy is converted to permanent coverage, the ex-
pense saving will offset any extra mortality." Id. at 20. Elimination of the need for a
medical examination saves the company money. Also, a company may pay a lower
commission to its salespeople on converted policies. See 20 TRANSACTIONS OF THE
SOC'Y OF ACTUARIES D692 (1968); 1 TRANSACTIONS OF THE Soc'Y OF ACTUARIES 207.
217 (1947). One major United States life insurance company reported that it charges
an average of five percent for the combination of renewability and convertibility fea-
tures. Survey at 46.
Renewability and convertibility costs also could be determined by separating them
from each premium payment and accumulating them with interest. Such calculations
can be found in actuarial literature. At age 60 the resultant fund would be approxi-
mately $100 for each $1,000 of face value, or ten percent. See Huntington, Derivation
of Premium Rates for Renewable Term Insurance, Table 2. 10 TRANSACTIONS OF THE
Soc'v OF ACTUARIES 329, 340 (1959); Survey at 12. See also Survey at 16.
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ability issue; however, it is based on an assumption that frequently
will be invalid. Alternatively, the issue could be tried in court in order
to avoid a conclusive presumption of uninsurability. The burden of
proving uninsurability could be placed upon the heirs of the separate
estate or the beneficiaries under any claimed separate portion of the
policy. If they meet their burden of proof, the court could either allo-
cate a fixed percentage of the proceeds to the separate estate or place
an appropriate value on the insurability right as of the date of mar-
riage.114
Although this discussion has not included an exhaustive study of the cost of renew-
ability and convertibility features, it does indicate that the cost of such features is small
in comparison to total premiums paid. Indeed, there are several different methods for
computing such costs, and the authorities are not in complete agreement as to the
most appropriate method and the underlying assumptions. See, e.g., Fassel, Term Con-
version Option, I TRANSACTIONS OF THE SOC'Y OF ACTUARIES 177 (1949); Huntington,
supra, and Gross Premium Rates for Renewable Term Insurance, 12 TRANSACTIONS OF
THE SOC'Y OF ACTUARIES 526 (1961); Ziock, Gross Premiums for Term Insurance with
Varying Benefits and Premiums, 22 TRANSACTIONS OF THE SOC'Y OF ACTUARIES 19
(1970); Survey at 1, 19, 26-26A.
The figure ten per cent is suggested to represent the average cost of insurability to
one holding a renewable and convertible policy. It has been shown that, on an average,
ten percent of premium payments are for renewability and convertibility costs and that
ten percent of the face value of a term policy is a reasonable approximation of the
actual fund contributed by the insured to pay for his renewability and convertibility
costs. It should not be objectionable that this figure is an average, and as such, is not
adjusted for particular cases, because courts have commonly used the cash values of
whole life policies without adjusting them to reflect the insurability status of the in-
sured. Cash value is only an average value as the actual value of any policy may be
greater or lesser than its cash value. Survey at 34. Finally, it is submitted that although
not all term policies are renewable or convertible, or both, a term policy for more
than one year, in essence, gives the insured a valuable "right to renew ' ; for each year
during the term. Survey at 30. Therefore, the ten percent figure should be applied to all
term policies, whether neither renewable nor convertible, as an approximate measure
of the cost of insurability to the insured.
114. After the insured has become uninsurable or has died, it is not uncommon for
courts to be called upon to value life insurance policies. For instance, when a company
has been found to have wrongfully cancelled a policy and the insured is no longer in-
surable, courts have held that the value of the policy is the present value of its face
amount, based upon the insured's life expectancy, less the present value of premiums
which would have been paid during that time. Continental Assurance Co. v. Supreme
Constr. Corp., 375 F.2d 378, 384 (5th Cir. 1967) (trial court determined value of
policy, under Texas law, as of a point in time three years prior to trial when insured
was in poor health and where he had died one year prior to trial); National Life &
Accident Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 154 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (valuation of two
policies for living, but uninsurable, insured); Franklin v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 4 Wn.
2d 541, 563, 104 P.2d 310, 320, 322-23 (1940) (valuation of group-term policy for
living, but uninsurable, insured). See also Caminetti v. Manierre, 23 Cal. 2d 94, 142
P.2d 741, 747 (1943)(dictum); Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 245, 335-36, 373-75 (1970);
Mather, Measure of Damages for Wrongful Repudiation of Executory Life Insurance
Contracts in Texas, 12 TEXAS L. REv. 251, 267-69 (1934).
Commentators have suggested that, upon divorce, the actual value of the policy,
including its value resulting from uninsurability of the insured, be considered when
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Another advantage of the risk payment doctrine is that it protects
the noninsured spouse from constructive fraud. 115 Under the risk
payment doctrine, the noninsured spouse is entitled to one-half the
term insurance proceeds if community funds were used to pay the
most recent premium. Thus, the noninsured spouse cannot be pre-
cluded from receiving proceeds, as would occur under the inception of
title doctrine which limits recovery to one-half of the community pre-
miums exclusive of interest. Nor could he or she be limited to a frac-
tion of the face amount, as is the case under the apportionment rule,
where the community had paid the last several premiums on a policy
which had been in force years before the marriage.
There is a potential for inequity under the risk payment doctrine
where the spouses have divorced and the insurance policy was not
disposed of during the property settlement. For instance, if the insured
spouse paid premiums with separate funds after divorce, the risk
payment rule would allocate all of the proceeds to that spouse's sepa-
rate estate.11 6 However, the doctrine need not lead to an unfair result
because there are remedies available to the noninsured former spouse
making a property settlement. Huie, Community Properly Law as Applied to Life In-
surance, 17 TEXAS L. REV. 121. 142-43 (1939); Comment, Insurance and the Commnu-
nity, 25 LA. L. REV. 492, 504-05 (1965). The actual value of the policy takes into
account the insured's health and is calculated in the manner indicated in Continental
Assurance, supra. Actuaries have generally agreed that this method is the most accu-
rate. Survey at 3, 18, 23, 39. If the insured is insurable, but at an increased risk and
premium because of deteriorating health, the actual value of the policy would be the
present value of the premiums for a new policy less the present value of the remaining
premiums on the insured's present policy. Survey at 9, 17, 35, 42, 47. However, the
most simple method for dividing life insurance upon divorce may be division of the
policy into two separate policies. Insurance companies are usually willing to do this.
Thurman, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation of Community Property, I ARIz. L. REV.
253,273 (1959).
115. See note 40 and accompanying text supra. It may be contended that the risk
payment doctrine could operate unfairly by allowing a married insured to shift the
proceeds of a life insurance policy to the benefit of his separate estate by paying the last
premium before death with his separate funds. The doctrines of actual and construc-
tive fraud should prevent this however. For a discussion of the constructive fraud doc-
trine in a community property life insurance setting, see Davis v. Prudential Life Ins.
Co. of America, 331 F.2d 346, 351-52 (5th Cir. 1964); Givens v. Girard Life Ins. Co.
of America, 480 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). No fraud problem with the use of
the apportionment doctrine has arisen even though an insured paying premiums out of
separate funds subsequent to marriage may thereby increase his share of the policy
proceeds in derogation of the community interest.
116. Where community property life insurance has not been included in the settle-
ment at the time of divorce, the ex-spouses should own the policy as tenants in com-
mon for as long as the last community premium is paying for the protection element.
When the first post-divorce (separate) premium payment is made, the risk portion of
the policy should be deemed separate property, although the community will still have
an interest in the cash value, if any.
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to recover an appropriate share of the proceeds. He or she may have
an action in fraud l17 or conversion against the insured spouse for con-
cealing the policy at the time of divorce or against the noninsured
spouse's attorney for malpractice in neglecting to inquire as to the ex-
istence and character of life insurance. 118 In such a suit, the appro-
priate measure of damages should be the same amount that would
have been recovered if the policy had been divided at divorce."19
B. The Risk Payment Doctrine and Cash Value Insurance
The risk payment doctrine should be applied to cash value as well
as term insurance. Cash value policies are separable into a temporary
risk (or protection) portion and a permanent savings portion. 20 The
117. See Annot. 152 A.L.R. 190 (1944)(misrepresentation of the financial status
of a spouse as grounds for relief from the divorce decree property settlement).
118. See Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975)),
in which the former wife sued her divorce attorney for negligence in failing to assert
her community interest in the retirement benefits of her husband. She won a judgment
of$100,000 in this action.
119. Upon request insurance companies will split a single policy into two separate
policies. Thurman, supra note 114. If it is assumed that the divorce court would have
divided the policy evenly, with each ex-spouse responsible for his or her half, an appro-
priate measure of damages would be one-half the face value of the policy less one-
half the total amount of separate premiums paid. For example, assume the community
paid $150 per year for seven years for a $10,000 policy of insurance, after which
there was a divorce and the husband fraudulently concealed the policy from the wife's
attorney and the court. Assume also that he died three years after the divorce, having
paid three annual premiums from his separate funds. In this hypothetical, the wife's
recovery would be $4,775: one-half the face amount of the policy ($5,000), less one-half
the separate premiums the husband paid for three years (/ X 3 years X $150/year
= $225). One-half the premium ($225) is the same amount she would have had to pay
to keep her half of the policy in force had it been divided at the time of divorce. In
this situation, the principle and effect are the same whether term or cash value policies
are involved.
Courts may avoid the issue of whose fault it was that the policy was not disposed of
in the divorce decree by limiting the recovery of the noninsured spouse to one-half
the face value minus one-half the premiums subsequently paid by the insured surviving
spouse cumulated at 8% compound interest. The premium payment by the insured
spouse is treated as a loan to the noninsured spouse, yet part of each premium pay-
ment is recognized as paying for the protection element of the policy.
120. See notes 14 & 15 and accompanying text supra, and notes 126, 138 & 139
infra. It may be argued that it is incorrect to think of the policy as consisting of two
components and consider the cash value as a savings account owned by the policy-
owner because the cash value is not his money, but belongs to the insurance company,
which holds it and invests it as a reserve. However, from a realistic economic stand-
point, the cash surrender value is an asset of the insured. See J. BELTH, THE RETAIL
PRICE STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE 33-35 (1966). Furthermore, the re-
serve element of the life insurance policy, upon which the cash value is based, is car-
ried on the books of the life insurance company as a liability as it represents an obli-
gation to the insured. See J. MACLEAN, supra note 10, at 14, 111 n.l. See also J. No-
381
Washington Law Review Vol. 51: 351, 1976
risk payment doctrine should be applied to the risk component of the
cash value policy, while the cash value portion should be apportioned
between the estates121 according to the number of years each had con-
tributed premiums.122 The labels term or cash value should make no
BACK, LIFE INSURANCE ACCOUNTING 115 (1969). The United States Supreme Court has
stated:
[T] he courts have long recognized that the surplus of the paid premiums accumu-
lated to make up the cash surrender value should be treated for some purposes as
though in fact a "fund" held by the insurer for the benefit of the insured. Judge
Addison Brown stated in In re McKinney, 15 F. 535, 537 [S.D.N.Y. 1883]:
"Though this excess of premiums paid is legally the sole property of the com-
pany, still in practical effect though not in law, it is moneys of the assured
deposited with the company in advance to make up the deficiency in later
premiums .... So long as the policy remains in force the company has not
practically any beneficial interest in it, except as its custodian, with the obliga-
tion to maintain it unimpaired and suitably invested for the benefit of the in-
sured. This is the practical, though not the legal, relation of the company to
this fund."
... Thus in economic reality the insurer pays the beneficiary the insured's "fund."
plus another amount sufficient to perform the insurer's promise to pay the pro-
ceeds on the insured's death.
United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 59 (1958)(emphasis added, citations omitted). See
Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 469 (1913); Hiscock v. Mertens, 205 U.S. 202,
211 (1907); United States v. Behrens, 230 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1956); Rowen v.
Commissioner, 215 F.2d 641, 647 (2d Cir. 1954); Stephens, supra note 15, at 353
n.20. In Bess the Court held that a tax lien effected during an insured's life against the
cash surrender value of his life insurance policy attached after his death to the pro-
ceeds in the hands of the beneficiary in the amount of the cash surrender value. For a
discussion of possible motives as to why some are opposed to considering a cash value
policy as separable into savings and protection components, see J. BELTH, supra at
34-35; THE CONSUMERS UNION REPORT ON LIFE INSURANCE 16-17 (rev. ed. 1972); N.
DACEY. supra note 84, at 167. 176.
121. It may be asked why the cash value is apportioned rather than apportioning
another of the nonforfeiture values to which the insured is entitled upon termination
of his policy, such as the face amount of either the paid-up life or the extended term
options. The cash value was chosen because it represents the equity built up in the
policy and is a monetary measure of the worth of each of the nonforfeiture options
available to the terminating policyholder. Thus, the face amount of the paid-up life
option and the length of time of protection under the extended term option depend on
how large the cash value is at termination of the policy.
122. For example, assume a single person purchases a $10,000 nonparticipating
whole life policy and pays five annual premiums before marriage and fifteen annual
premiums after marriage. Upon death of the insured 20 years later, the cash value may
be $2,000. The cash value would be apportioned according to the nature of the prop-
erty used to pay the premiums: one-fourth (5/20) would be characterized as separate
property, and three-fourths (15/20) would be characterized as community property.
The risk portion of the policy, i.e., the face value ($10,000) less the cash value
($2,000), $8,000, would be characterized according to whether separate or commu-
nity funds were used to pay the final premium.
If a participating (dividend-paying) policy is involved, the calculations required are
somewhat more involved, though not overly complex. For example, assume that an
insured died after having paid his twentieth premium on a $10,000 participating policy.
and that throughout the life of the policy, the dividends had been used to reduce the
annual premium payments. Assume that the gross annual premium is $200, and that
at the time of the twentieth premium the dividend was $80, thereby reducing the net
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difference in application of the risk payment doctrine r23 because some
term policies actually have a cash value124 while some cash value poli-
premium cost to $120. Assume also that the insured had been single for 15 years and
had been married for 5 years before his death. Because the $80 dividend was paid as
a result of 15 years' premium payments from separate funds and 5 years' premium
payments from community funds, the source of three-fourths (15/20) of the dividend,
i.e., $60, is attributed to the separate premium payments. The balance ($20) is deemed
to have been paid with community funds. Therefore, the $200 gross premium has been
paid with $60 separate funds and $140 community funds. Accordingly, 30% of the
protection element should be deemed separate property and 70% community property.
A sum equal to 15/20 + (.30 X 5/20) of the cash value should be characterized as
separate property, the remainder being community property.
If the dividends in the previous example are not applied against the gross premium,
the calculations are much simpler. If paid-up additions (small amounts of paid-up life
insurance) had been purchased with the annual dividends attributable to premiums
paid with separate funds, the paid-up additions should be characterized as separate
property. The remaining paid-up additions are, of course, community property. If the
annual premiums were used to buy one-year term insurance, the character of the pro-
ceeds of that insurance would depend on the character of the last premium payment.
If the annual dividends had been left with the community to accumulate interest as a
separate fund, then that fund should be treated as a savings account. In these situations,
the cash value should be apportioned as if a nonparticipating policy were involved.
It is recognized that earlier contributions to the cash value through premium pay-
ments will have contributed a greater share to the total cash value than apportionment
recognizes because of the effect of compound interest. However, the complexity of
actuarial calculations required to allocate a proportionately greater share of the cash
value to the earlier premium payment prohibits their use, especially since most policies
do not have any cash value during the first years they are in force because most of the
first premium payment goes for selling expenses. Slight inaccuracies in this approach
may occur because some of the cash value, or the interest thereon, may be combined
with the premium payments in later years to pay for the risk of death. Because the
risk of death is greater the older the insured, the premium payments alone may not
cover the entire risk. Even in years when this happens, however, the cash value still
grows as a result of compound interest.
If a premium loan provision (enabling an insured to borrow from his accumulated
cash value to pay premiums) is providing for the payment of premiums at the time of
the insured's death, then the proceeds should be characterized as separate or commu-
nity in the same proportion that each estate is deemed to have contributed to the cash
value, for the cash value is the source of the premiums. Similarly, if the policy is paid
up (whether by reason of a nonforfeiture provision or through a limited-payment life
policy) or if the policy is of the extended term variety under the nonforfeiture pro-
vision, the insurance proceeds should be characterized as separate and community
property in the same proportions that each estate was deemed to have contributed to
the cash value.
123. If a term policy has cash value, such cash value should be apportioned be-
tween the separate and community estates and the risk (or protection) portion should
be characterized according to the source of the last premium payment. Similarly, if a
cash value policy has no cash value, it should be treated as a pure term policy.
124. Although as a general rule term policies do not accumulate cash values, some
level term policies, such as level term-to-age-65, commonly have small cash value
elements which enable the insurer to charge a level premium and have a level face
amount over an extended period of time. Part of the cash value in such policies is
used in later years to help pay for the risk portion. The cash value is built up during
the earlier years and is diminished in later years. When the policy expires at age 65
there is no residual cash value. See S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, JR., supra note 14, at
78, 79.
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cies do not.1 25 The important consideration is the actual composition
of the policy proceeds at the death of the insured, i.e., how much of
the proceeds is attributable to a cash value component and how much
is attributable to the protection component.
The Washington Supreme Court has accepted the view that cash
value insurance is a combination of both savings and protection ele-
ments. 126 Moreover, several courts have recognized that where insur-
125. If all the cash value has been borrowed, a cash value policy resembles a
term policy. Also, it is common for cash value policies to have no cash value during
the first two or three years. See, e.g., the tables for common cash value policies in
BEST'S FLITCRAFT COMPEND, supra note 41, at 155. The insurance law in each of the
community property states does not require cash value policies to have cash value un-
til after three full years of premiums have been paid. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
20-1231(B)(2) (Supp. 1974-75); CAL. INS. CODE § 10160(b) (West 1972); IDAHO
CODE § 41-1927(2)(b) (Supp. 1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:168(A)(2) (West
Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 688A.290(2)(b) (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
58-8-3(2) (Supp. 1973); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.44a, § 2(2) (Supp. 1974-75);
WASH. REV. CODE § 48.23.350(2)(b) (1974).
126. In In re Leuthold's Estate, 52 Wn. 2d 299, 324 P.2d 1103 (1958), the Wash-
ington Supreme Court held that a decedent spouse's one-half interest in the cash
surrender value of a community life insurance policy insuring the life of the surviving
spouse is taxable under the Washington inheritance tax statute. Concerning the na-
ture of a cash value policy, the court first quoted with approval from a well-known
insurance text, J. MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE 11, 13 (8th ed. 1957), and then sum-
marized the character of such a policy:
"Comparing a level-premium plan with a yearly-renewable-term policy of the
same face amount, we note that under the former, when a policyholder dies, the
accumulated reserve on his policy will, of course, be available as part of the
'face amount' payable. Consequently, as the reserve increases, the insurance, or
amount at risk (face amount less reserve), decreases. Thus the increasing death
rate is offset by a decreasing effective amount of insurance, and the cost is kept
down to a practicable figure.
• . . It is very important to note that under the level-premium plan a policy
of $1,000 does not give actual insurance of $I,000, (i.e., the company is never
'on the risk' for that amount) but only of $1,000 less the policyholder's own
accumulated excess payments. It is thus evident, as already pointed out, that
the plan is not pure insurance but rather a combination of a decreasing insur-
ance with an increasing investment, the two amounts being computed mathema-
tically in such a way that in any year their sum is equal to the 'face amount'
payable under the policy. Failure to grasp this simple fact has led to a great
deal of misunderstanding of the level-premium plan ... "
As indicated in the above quotation from Maclean's treatise, life insurance
companies set up an account for each policyholder in the same manner as a
savings bank establishes an account for each depositor. As premiums are re-
ceived, the insured's account is credited annually with the proper increase in
its cash value. If an insured owns a one-thousand-dollar policy which has been
in force for several years and has a cash value of six hundred dollars, and then
dies, the insurer pays the beneficiary the sum of one thousand dollars. But. con-
trary to popular misconception, the insurer does not pay the whole one thou-
sand dollars entirely out of its own funds. It pays the six hundred dollars which
was owned by the insured at the time of his death (thus wiping out his cash
value), plus four hundred dollars from net premiums paid in by other insured
persons.
The situation in the present case is no different than if Mr. Leuthold had
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ance has been paid for partly with separate and partly with commu-
nity funds, the community has a pro rata interest in the cash value. 27
Thus, there is a current judicial basis for treating cash value policies
according to the risk payment analysis. 128 All that need be added is
the concept that the risk (or protection) portion of the policy is the
property of the estate that paid for protection against the risk under
which the insured died. 129
taken community funds and opened a savings account with a bank in his own
name.
52 Wn. 2d at 303-04, 324 P.2d at 1106. Courts of other states have ruled in accordance
with the holding in Leuthold. See note 109 supra.
127. In Pollock v. Pollock, 7 Wn. App. 394, 499 P.2d 231 (1972), the court
modified the trial court's decree by increasing the wife's share of the community
property. The court declared:
If post-marital payments came from community property, the community
would have . . . a pro rata interest in the cash surrender value based on the
total post-marital premium payments divided by the total premium payments
made before and after marriage.
Id. at 403, 499 P.2d at 237. This rule has also been used in Texas. Berdoll v. Berdoll,
145 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). A rule similar to this has been approved by
courts of Arizona and Louisiana. Those courts have held that the measure of the
community interest in a separate policy at divorce is the increase in cash value of
the policy resulting from payments made with community funds. See Blaine v. Blaine,
63 Ariz. 100, 159 P.2d 786, 790 (1945); Connell v. Connell, 316 So. 2d 421, 428-29
(La. App. 1975); Butler v. Butler, 228 So. 2d 339, 343 (La. App. 1969); Broyles v.
Broyles, 215 So. 2d 526, 529 (La. App. 1968).
128. The courts of Arizona and Texas have accepted the concepts that (1)
when life insurance has been paid partly with separate funds and partly with com-
munity funds, the community has a fractional interest in the cash value, see id., and
(2) the character of a pure protection (term) policy is determined according to the
source of the last premium payment, see notes 100-03 and accompanying text supra.
Therefore it would be easy for the courts of these states to combine both of these
concepts and accept the risk payment doctrine for use with cash value insurance.
129. The risk payment doctrine is also applicable to federal estate tax problems
concerning the amount of community-owned life insurance proceeds that should be
included in the gross estate of an insured spouse who dies after the noninsured spouse.
Because the successors in interest of the noninsured spouse receive a one-half owner-
ship in the policy upon that spouse's death, this interest should be treated as a re-
ceipt of a life insurance policy of half the size. If so treated, it becomes the duty of
the noninsured spouse's successors to contribute premiums necessary to keep one-half
the policy in force. If they do so and the surviving spouse also continues to contri-
bute premiums, then, upon death of the surviving spouse, one-half the proceeds will
be characterized as owned by the successors and one-half by the surviving spouse.
See, e.g., Scott v. Commissioner, 374 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1967). The Scott court ap-
plied the apportionment rule and came to the same conclusion that the risk payment
doctrine would have if applied to the facts. See also Rev. Rul. 75-100, 1975 INT.
REV. BULL. No. 12, at 15.
If the successors in interest of the deceased noninsured spouse do not contribute
one-half of the premiums necessary to keep the policy in force, their half of the
policy should be treated as having lapsed, with their rights limited to recovery of
one-half of the former community's interest in the policy's cash value. See notes
116-19 and accompanying text supra. The surviving spouse, required to pay all sub-
sequent premiums, would have the following interest characterized as his separate
property and included in his gross estate on his death: the policy's face value less the
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The risk payment doctrine, as applied to cash value life insurance,
is doctrinally sound. It is consistent with the unique characteristics of
cash value life insurance, which should be regarded as a hybrid type
of property composed of an asset analogous to savings (cash value)
and an asset that is basically term insurance (the protection element).
The community property source doctrine 30 leads to apportionment of
the cash value according to the number of years the community and
separate estates paid premiums. The principle also leads to the conclu-
sion that the ownership of the protection portion of the policy should
be traced back to the source of the last premium payment. The risk
payment doctrine recognizes the fact that cash value life insurance
involves a series of unilateral contracts. As each contract is created by
payment of a premium, the insurance company becomes obligated to
pay the protection portion of the policy upon death of the insured.
Actuaries have recognized that each year's insurance coverage in a
cash value policy is in the nature of a renewal of the contract.' 3'
interest of the deceased spouse's successors, which would be one-half the interpolated
terminal reserve value of the policy at the death of the first spouse. Alternatively, if
the successors of the deceased spouse had been precluded from paying half of the
premiums by a wrongful act of the surviving spouse, their recovery would be one-half
of the policy's face value less one-half of the premiums paid by the surviving spouse
until his or her death. In place of using both of the above rules, the court could, re-
gardless of the successors' intent or the surviving spouse's wrongful acts, limit the re-
covery of the noninsured spouse's successors to one-half the face value less half the
premiums subsequently paid by the insured surviving spouse cumulated at 8% com-
pound interest. This rule would treat the premium payment by the surviving spouse
as a loan to the successors of the predeceasing noninsured spouse, yet recognize that
part of each premium payment pays for the protection element of the policy.
Because the amount of life insurance proceeds included in the gross estates of de-
cedents depends on each state's community property law, the risk payment doctrine is
not currently useful if the particular jurisdiction in which the deceased was a resi-
dent has accepted either the apportionment rule or the inception of title rule. It is
available for use, however, in Arizona, which has accepted the risk payment doctrine
for term life insurance. Texas also may have accepted the risk payment doctrine for
term insurance. See notes 100-03 and accompanying text supra. The risk payment
doctrine could be utilized for federal estate tax questions concerning deceased Idaho
and Nevada residents as these two states have not yet accepted either the apportion-
ment or inception of title rule. The basic concepts of the risk payment doctrine are
available for immediate use, however, by federal courts handling the estate tax prob-
lems of life insurance policies transferred in contemplation of death where premium
payments subsequent to the transfer are made by the transferee. See INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 2035. If the transferee is paying for the risk at the time of death, the
protection portion of the policy should not be considered as having been transferred
in contemplation of death.
130. See notes 57-65 and accompanying text supra.
131. Actuaries W. MENGE & C. FISCHER. THE MATHEMATICS OF LIFE INSURANCE
98 (2d ed. 1965), state:
The major expenses incurred by a life insurance company in selling and issuing
a policy must be met in the first policy year, while the expenses incurred in the
386
Community Property Life Insurance
Application of the risk payment rule to cash value policies is also
equitable. The noninsured spouse is protected against constructive
fraud because he or she is entitled to one-half of the protection ele-
ment of the policy where the community had paid for the insurance at
the time of the insured's death, plus one-half of the community's cash
value interest in the policy. The separate and community estate's pro-
portionate interests in the cash value can be deemed to compensate
those estates for any insurability value claimed, 32 or the insurability
question can be resolved by following the approaches suggested pre-
viously with respect to term insurance. 133
Perhaps a reason that the risk payment doctrine was not originally
adopted when Webb (1875) and Moseman (1886) were decided is
that the concept of a nonterm policy consisting of both a permanent
cash value portion and a temporary protection portion was neither as
well known nor as well accepted as it is today. This was due partially
to the fact that many nonterm policies at that time had no cash value.
It was not until 1906134 in Louisiana and 1911135 in California that
laws were adopted which made it a legal requirement for such policies
to have a cash surrender value, 36 although by that time most compa-
nies were guaranteeing cash values.' 37 More recently, the notion that
renewal years (the policy years following the first policy year) are comparative-
ly small.
See also id. at 100. A vice president and actuary of one of the largest insurance
companies in the United States has written that "permanent cash value policies, such
as whole life, may be viewed in one sense as renewable policies, since the continua-
tion each year is at the option of the insured." Survey at 30.
132. This method would, in effect, place no value on the insurability privilege.
See notes 107-10 and accompanying text supra. If this method were adopted, to be
consistent any cash value in a term policy would be treated in the same manner as
cash value in a cash value policy.
133. See notes 107-14 and accompanying text supra. Methods applicable to term
insurance can be applied only to the protection portion of the policy, however, and
not to the full amount of death proceeds, some of which will be attributable to the
cash value. Thus, if the insurability right of a pure term policy (one without cash
value) is valued at ten percent of the face amount, the insurability right of a cash
value policy should be valued at ten percent of the risk (or protection) portion of
the cash value policy. Ten percent of the protection portion represents the value of
the right to be able to annually renew the protection portion of the cash value policy.
Survey at 39A. Since the risk portion of a cash value policy decreases annually, the
amount of the protection element in effect immediately before death should be the
figure used in determining the value of the insurability right.
134. Act No. 193, [1906] La. Acts 346-48.
135. Ch. 666, § 1, [1911] Cal. Stat. 1272-73.
136. For a general history of cash surrender values in the law and in the Ameri-
can life insurance industry, see J. CUMMINS, DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE SUR-
RENDER VALUES IN THE UNITED STATES 21, 27, 39, 71 (1973).
137. Id. at 39.
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cash value insurance can be viewed as consisting of separable savings
and protection portions has been widely accepted,1 38 and has been
endorsed by the Treasury Department. 139
138. Professors S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, JR., LIFE INSURANCE (5th ed. 1958)
state:
It might be worthwhile to note the justification for the changing view of life
insurance contracts, and the reason why whole life contracts have not in the
past emphasized the increasing investment, decreasing term insurance concept.
In the early days of the business there were no nonforfeiture values under life
insurance contracts. If an individual was forced, because of inability to pay or
otherwise, to cease premium payments under his contract, no return of any sort
was available to him as a matter of contract. The contract promised to pay in
the event of the occurrence of death or survival to a certain age, but if the con-
tract was dropped prior to the occurrence of these contingencies, all premiums
were considered fully earned, and the reserve or savings element was forfeited.
[Some companies did allow a cash value, but even here the policy usually con-
tained no provision for them so that the policyholder had no right to any sur-
render value. The values when allowed were small and generally were granted
only if application was made within a short period after lapse .... ]
With the increasing emphasis on the living values in life insurance and be-
cause the economic approach is easier for the layman to understand and pro-
duces identically the same results, the legal interpretation of the contract has
been modified accordingly; similarly, the economic concept of all permanent
forms of life insurance has become increasingly accepted as the more logical
explanation.
Id. at 82-83 & 72 n.l (footnote material in brackets, emphasis added). The "econom-
ic approach" and "economic concept" of life insurance mentioned in the last para-
graph quoted is the principle that cash value insurance can be divided into two parts:
decreasing term insurance and increasing investment. Id. at 81.
Interestingly, in 1895 the community property jurisdiction of Quebec, Canada, en-
acted a statute that required that the risk payment doctrine be applied to certain life
insurance policies. Act Respecting Life Insurance, 58 Vict. 86-87, c. 46, § I (Can.).
Recently, the Act in which it was contained was replaced. Ch. 70, § 438, [19741
Quebec Stat. 683.
139. In U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, 91ST CONG., IST SESS., TAX REFORM STUDIES AND
PROPOSALS (Comm. Print 1969), the Treasury Department suggested changes in the
tax laws. Some of these suggestions were enacted into law in the Tax Reform Act of
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
One suggestion which was not then adopted by Congress was that the present estate
tax rule dealing with transfers of life insurance in contemplation of death be changed:
There has been criticism of the present contemplation of death rules because
they do not reflect what any given life insurance premium pays for. Each pre-
mium can be regarded as constituting three elements: The annual increase in
the cash value of the policy, a loading charge, and the purchase of the protec-
tion element of the policy (essentially -year-term insurance).
In order to reflect the economic realities of life insurance, in this regard, the
contemplation of death rules as applied to life insurance will be modified. If the
insured transfers the incidents of ownership of a policy but makes any premium
payments during the 3 years preceding death, a transfer in contemplation of
death of a portion of the policy proceeds will be deemed to have been made.
The value of the transfer at death will be the increase in cash value in the policy
resulting from the premium payments so made plus the difference between the
face amount of the policy and its cash value at date of death (the protection
element of the policy).
388
Community Property Life Insurance
IV. CONCLUSION
The inception of title and apportionment rules, both formulated
during the nineteenth century, do not treat life insurance as a unique
type of property. Only the risk payment doctrine recognizes that life
insurance is a series of discrete unilateral contracts, that it is com-
posed of both temporary and permanent elements, and that any rights
under the policy should be analyzed with such principles in mind.
Therefore, both the judiciary and the legislatures of community prop-
erty states should accept the risk payment doctrine as the most logical
and equitable of the three alternative methods of determining separate
and community interests in life insurance proceeds.
V. ADDENDUM
After this comment went to press, the Idaho Supreme Court accept-
ed the risk payment doctrine for use with term insurance. Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Johnson, Idaho.., 544 P.2d 294 (1975). In this
For example, assume an insured transferred a $10,000 policy to his son more
than 3 years prior to death and paid all premiums due prior to his death. At
date of death the policy has a cash surrender value of $5,000. Three years prior
to death the policy had a cash value of $4,600. Under this rule, $5,400 would
be included in the decedent's gross estate-the $5,000 in term insurance pro-
tection purchased with the last premium payment and the $400 increase in cash
value occasioned by the payment of the last three premiums.
Since term insurance generally has no cash value, each year's premium is the
purchase of the protection equal to the face amount of the policy. Therefore,
payment of a premium on a term policy within the 3 years preceding death will
be a transfer in contemplation of death equal in value to the full face amount
of the policy.
TAx REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, supra, pt. 3, at 374. Because of the fact the
Treasury wanted this rule adopted, it is evident that it felt the splitting of cash value
life insurance into savings and protection portions could be handled without undue
administrative difficulty. Also, under this rule, the Treasury did not attempt to value
the insurability right, leaving its value at zero.
Consider also the following language from Treasury publications in which it is
recognized that, for practical purposes, the cash value policy is divisible into the
protection and investment portions, and that each annual premium payment pays for
both protection and an increase in cash value.
If the amount payable upon death at any time during the year exceeds the
cash value of the insurance policy at the end of the year, the entire amount of
such excess is considered current life insurance protection.
Treas. Reg. § 1.72-16(b)(3) (1963).
Under the "split dollar" arrangement, the employer and employee join in pur-
chasing an insurance contract, in which there is a substantial investment ele-
ment, on the life of the employee. The employer provides the funds to pay part
of the annual premium to the extent of the increase in the cash surrender value
each year, the employee pays the balance of the annual premium.
Rev. Rul. 64-328, 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 11-12.
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case, after the husband and his first wife were divorced, the husband
took out a group term life insurance policy and named his first wife as
beneficiary. The first nine months' premiums were paid from his
separate funds before his second marriage. He then married his second
wife, paid premiums on the policy with community funds for ten and
one-half years, and died.
The court considered and rejected the rationales behind both the
inception of title and apportionment rules, refusing to hold either that
a separate property interest in the policy vested at its issuance or that
a community property interest vested as premiums were paid from
community funds. Instead, the court held that rights in the policy pro-
ceeds did not vest until the insured died, for up until that time it was
uncertain whether the community would still be paying premiums at
the time of the insured's death. The result was that one-half of the
proceeds were distributed to the beneficiary, for a spouse is deemed
to have testamentary power over one-half of the community property
at death. The other half of the proceeds were retained by the second
wife.
James M. Higbee*
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